VIOLENCE AND DEMOCRACY:

BRAZILIAN PRE-2022 ELECTIONS SCENARIO

Perceptions about the fear of Violence, Authoritarianism and Democracy





PROJECT TECHNICAL SHEET

Conception and technical coordination

Mônica Sodré Renato Sérgio de Lima

Treatment and validation of data, analysis and building of Scales:

James Ferreira Moura Junior Jose Alexandre da Silva Júnior Ranulfo Paranhos Rodrigo Lins

Methodological consulting

Paulo Jannuzzi

Technical Team

Damião S. de Almeida Segundo David Marques Isabela Sobral Isabelle Rodrigues Larissa Malta Luiza Veronese Lacava Marina Bohnenberger

Preparation of items Diego Moraes

Sampling and collection Datafolha Institute

Text Review Érica Amorim

Graphic design, art and layout teoMenna estúdio

Cover picture iStock

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VIOLENCE AND DEMOCRACY: BRAZILIAN PRE-2022 ELECTIONS SCENARIO

Perceptions about the fear of Violence, Authoritarianism and Democracy

The study "Violence and democracy: Brazilian Pre-2022 Elections Scenario – Perceptions of the fear of Violence, Authoritarianism and Democracy" is an initiative of the Political Action Network for Sustainability (RAPS) in a partnership with the Brazilian Public Safety Forum (FBSP), with the support of the Canada Fund for Local Initiatives (FCIL). The methodology, formulation and the analysis involved in this publication have been conducted by the technical team. The sampling and data collection were commissioned by both organizations from Datafolha Institute.





About FBSP

The Brazilian Public Safety Forum was established in March 2006 as a nongovernmental, nonpartisan, nonprofit organization, whose objective is building an environment of reference and technical cooperation in the field of police activity and countrywide management of public safety. Combining professionals of several segments (police, experts, municipal law enforcement, criminal justice operators, academic researchers and representatives from civil society), FBSP is focused on technical enhancement of police activity and democratic governance of public safety. FBSP makes a radical bet on transparency and on bringing the segments closer as tools for rendering accounts and modernizing public safety.





About RAPS

The Political Action Network for Sustainability (RAPS) is a nongovernmental, nonpartisan and independent organization which, since 2012, has the mission to contribute to the enhancement of democracy and of the Brazilian political process. RAPS' commitment is supporting political leaders from different parties and positions in the ideological spectrum in understanding and incorporating sustainability principles in their actions. RAPS' leadership is composed by 559 members from 28 political parties and from every region in the country. Of the total number of members, 211 are are currently holding elective office, namely: 8 Senators, 33 Federal House Representatives, 41 State House Members, 2 District House Representatives, 91 Councilmen, 1 Governor, 27 Mayors and 11 Lieutenant Mayors.

OPENING LETTER

Liberal democracies, those based on civil, social, political and human rights and respect for the Rule of Law are wearing down around the world, and, although the world is more democratic today than at any other point in history, the quality and the level of democracy enjoyed by the average citizen has dropped.

In Brazil, we have been ranked since 2019 as one of the ten countries with the highest autocratic trends in the world. Seven years ago we stopped being classified as a liberal democracy and fell into another category, now classified as an electoral democracy by the Varieties of Democracy (V-DEM), one of the think tanks with the most prestige worldwide. In the 2021 report, we ranked as one of the five global leaderships in the process known as "autocratization", along with Hungary, Poland, Serbia and Turkey, countries that have fazed a reduction in freedoms of expression and participation, political violence, closing of the civic space and tension between Branches of Power and institutions. THE RESEARCH MANAGED TO MEASURE A SERIES **OF DILEMMAS AND CHALLENGES THAT RULED AND RULE BRAZILIAN POLITICAL** LIFE AND ALLOWS **US TO RETHINK** STRATEGIES OF **MOBILIZATION AND CIVIC ACTION THAT CAN STRENGTHEN** EFFECTIVELY DEMOCRATIC VALUES **OF A PLURAL AND** DYNAMIC SOCIETY.

The intersection between violence and politics, between the guarantee of rights, safety and support for democratic regimes is becoming more latent and, in Brazil, the 2022 elections coming up will be held in a climate of insecurity, attack and under the cloud of fraud allegations, with emotions running high and in a scenario of growing polarization since 2013.

And it is from these intersections and from the need to understand them that this research is born, in a partnership between the Political Action Network for Sustainability (RAPS) and the Brazilian Public Safety Forum (FBSP). Launched shortly after September 7, 2022, the date that marked the 200 years of Brazil's Independence, the research seeks to understand the perception of Brazilian population regarding authoritarianism, the agenda of rights – typical of democracies – and its satisfaction and support to the democratic regime itself.

Conducting this research, especially at this moment, is justified by two reasons: first, the need to understand – five years after the research "Fear of Violence and Authoritarianism in Brazil", conducted by FBSP, and in light of an administration where symbolic and actual violence is constantly encouraged – how the Brazilian citizen relates to authoritarianism and the agenda of rights, two elements already measured in 2017 by the FBSP research. That year, the real possibility of institutional degradation and valuing hate speech and political violence had already been identified.

However, the research carried out in 2017 did not move into sizing support for democracy. And herein lies the pioneering nature of this initiative, i.e., understanding the level of support citizens have for democracy and election results, measured this year for the first time. By doing that, the research we are now publishing managed to measure a series of dilemmas and challenges that ruled – and still rule – the Brazilian political life and it allows us to rethink mobilization strategies for mobilization and civil action that may strengthen effectively democratic values of a plural and dynamic society. It is being done, moreover, at a moment marked by the attempt to destabilize democracy, especially relative to elections, and to weaken its bases: the respect for the results of the ballot, expressions of popular will, and the vote confidentiality. This context is summed, to the increase in the flexing of the access to guns in the country, which has transformed violence into a non-punctual phenomenon, but a factor that surpasses the level of Brazilian politics, jeopardizing democracy itself.

The findings of this research outline a challenging scenario, but they also sheds lights and point to paths out of the crisis we are facing. Among the good news: support to authoritarian positions drops, Brazilian population is massively favorable to the democratic Rule of Law and almost 90% of respondents agree that whoever wins on the ballot must be appointed on January 1, 2023, in a demonstration of civic order and valuation of the rights conquered for more than 35 years. We have progressed, also, in the recognition of civil rights: there is great agreement that those who experience hunger must be helped by the State, the recognition that there is racism in Brazil grew, the level of support to homosexual families raised, as did the perception that the conditions of the corrections facilities must be improved. At the same time, 7 in 10 people (66.4% of respondents) did not believe arming the population will increase safety.

The greatest challenges are not new, but they are gaining new shapes: the feeling unsafety raises; the concern with digital insecurity grows, as does the perception that one can be the victim of a crime. Support for authoritarianism is higher among those who feel the most unsafe. Furthermore, fear of political violence shows in 67.5% of respondents, who claim being afraid of being assaulted due to their political or partisan choices.

Finally, one of the most important conclusions is reached when looking to all three indices as a whole: regardless of the successive attacks to institutions and the stress democracy has been subjected to, the support to the democratic regime is still **IT IS PRECISELY** IN THE MOST VULNERABLE LAYERS. WHERE **INEOUALITIES ARE** EXPRESSED MORE ACUTELY. THAT DEMOCRACY TENDS TO BE RELATIVIZED. AT THE SAME TIME THAT THERE IS A **YEARNING FOR** THE GUARANTEE **OF RIGHTS. IN OTHER WORDS.** LOWER SUPPORT TO DEMOCRACY. CONCURRENTLY WITH HIGHER SUPPORT FOR **RIGHTS MAY INDICATE** THAT THE MEANINGS AND EXPRESSIONS **OF DEMOCRACY ARE** SPREAD THIN AMONG **POPULATIONS THAT COULD BENEFIT THE** MOST FROM BOTH.

high in Brazil. However, in groups with lower income and lower education level, the propensity to this support drops. Despite finding in these groups higher results of support to authoritarian measures, it is also in them that the highest levels of support to the agenda of rights is found.

The findings reveal, therefore, that it is precisely in the most vulnerable layers, where inequality is expressly in the most acute manner, that democracy tends to be relativized, at the same time the yearning for the guarantee of rights takes place. In other words, lower support to democracy, concurrently with higher support for rights may indicate that the meanings and expressions of democracy are spread thin among populations that could benefit the most from both.

From a public policy point of view, therefore, it is imperative that Brazilian society finds the means for the gains yielded by democracy are shared among all its citizens, translating into well-being and quality of life for the highest possible number of people. Therein lies one of the keys to changing this picture.

As a society, what we must do is create paths to address the insecurity coming from every side. Support for the protection of rights, as well as bulk support by Brazilians to the democratic Rule of Law gives us hinds that this can and must be done in the field of democracy, by strengthening institutions. For facing this and the next challenges, count on us. A democratic and plural society cannot be built if it remains hostage to fear and insecurity about its future and the survival of its citizens.



Mônica Sodré Renato Sergio de Lima

INTRODUCTION 14



INDEX OF PROPENSITY TO DEMOCRACY

20

Democracy and results analysis methodology 22

Impact of socio-demographic variables in the Propensity for Democracy Index 31

INDEX OF PROPENSITY FOR SUPPORTING AUTHORITARIAN POSITIONS 38

Authoritarianism, F Scale and methodology of analysis of results 40

The influence of demographic and social variables 52

Fear of violence and victimization 60





INDEX OF PROPENSITY FOR SUPPORTING THE CIVIL, HUMAN AND SOCIAL RIGHTS AGENDA 70

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS 82 APPENDICES 86

BOXES

TABLES

| 23 | TABLE 1 - Descriptive Statistics of the Propensity for Democracy Index - Brazil, 2022 | 28 |
|----|---|----|
| 24 | TABLE 2 - Fear of Violence, by question - Brazil 2022 | 63 |
| | TABLE 3 - Victimization, by question - Brazil, 2022 | 67 |
| 42 | | |

BOX 1 - Statements used to measure the degree of propensity for democracy in the brazilian population (aged 16 and over)

BOX 2 - Statements considered in building the propensity for democracy index

BOX 3 - Statements used for sizing the level of propensity for supporting authoritarian positions in the brazilian population (16 years of age or more), by dimension

BOX 4 - Estimated level of propensity to support authoritarian positions

47

49

61

64

75

BOX 5 - Scores calculated by dimension of the index of propensity to support authoritarian positions - Brazil, 2017 and 2022

BOX 6 - When used for sizing the level of fear of violence in brazilian population. "Would you say you are afraid of..."

BOX 7 - Mean indices of fear by quartile (2017 and 2022)

BOX 8 - Statements used for dimensioning the level of propensity for supporting the civil, human and social rights agenda in the brazilian population (16 years of age or more)

CHARTS

| CHART 1 - Propensity for Democracy, by statement - Brazil, 2022 | 25 | CHART 17 - Scores of the Index of Propensity for Supporting Authoritarian | |
|--|----|---|--|
| CHART 2 - Histogram of frequencies of the Propensity for Democracy Index | 29 | Positions, by race/color - Brazil, 2017 and 2022 | |
| CHART 3 - Propensity for Democracy Index, by sex - Brazil, 2022 | 31 | CHART 18 - Scores of the Index of Propensity for Supporting Authoritarian Positions, by sexual orientation - Brazil, 2017 and 2022 CHART 19 - Scores of the Index of Propensity for Supporting Authoritarian Positions, by level of education - Brazil, 2017 and 2022 CHART 20 - Scores of the Index of | |
| CHART 4 - Propensity for Democracy Index, by age range - Brazil, 2022 | 31 | | |
| CHART 5 - Propensity for Democracy Index, by level of education - Brazil, 2022 | 32 | | |
| CHART 6 - Propensity for Democracy Index, by income range - Brazil, 2022 | 33 | | |
| CHART 7 - Propensity for Democracy Index, by socioeconomic class - Brazil, 2022 | 35 | Propensity for Supporting Authoritarian Positions, by economic class - Brazil, 2017 and 2022 | |
| CHART 8 - Propensity for Democracy Index, by race/color - Brazil, 2022 | 35 | CHART 21 - Scores of the Index of Propensity for Supporting Authoritarian Positions, by region - Brazil, 2017 and 2022 | |
| CHART 9 - Propensity for Democracy Index, by religion - Brazil, 2022 | 35 | | |
| CHART 10 - Propensity for Democracy Index, by region - Brazil, 2022 | 36 | CHART 22 - Means of the index of Propensity for Supporting Authoritarian Positions, by nature of municipality - Brazil, 2022 CHART 23 - Scores of the Index of | |
| CHART 11 - Propensity for Democracy Index, by municipality size - Brazil, 2022 | 36 | | |
| CHART 12 - Propensity for Democracy Index, by nature of the municipality - Brazil, 2022 | 36 | Propensity for Supporting Authoritarian Positions, by municipality size - Brazil, 2017 and 2022 | |
| CHART 13 - Propensity for Supporting Authoritarian Positions, by statement and dimension, in percentile terms, of | 45 | CHART 24 - Scores of the Index of Propensity for Supporting Authoritarian Positions, by religion - Brazil, 2022 | |
| agreement and disagreement - Brazil, 2022 CHART 14 - Score calculated by dimension of the Index of Propensity for | 48 | CHART 25 - Level of Propensity for Supporting Authoritarian Positions by Fear of Violence | |
| supporting authoritarian positions 2022 CHART 15 - Propensity for Supporting Authoritarian Positions, by statement and | 50 | CHART 26 - Index of Propensity for Supporting the Rights Agenda due to Fear of Violence, Brazil - 2017 and 2022 | |
| dimension in percentile basis of agreement and disagreement - Brazil, 2017 and 2022 CHART 16 - Averages of the Index of | 52 | CHART 27 - Propensity for Supporting the Civil, Human and Social Rights Agenda, by statement (% agree and | |
| Propensity for supporting authoritarian positions, by age range - Brazil, 2017 and 2022 | | disagree) - Brazil, 2022 CHART 28 - Propensity for Supporting the Civil, Human and Social Rights Agenda, by sex - Brazil, 2022 | |
| | | CHART 29 - Propensity for Supporting the Civil, Human and Social Rights Agenda, by age range - Brazil, 2022 | |
| | | CHART 30 - Propensity for Supporting the Civil, Human and Social Rights Agenda, by race/color - Brazil, 2022 | |

53

54

55

56

57

58

58

59

65

69

77

80

80

80

INTRODUCTION

The research Violence and Democracy: the Brazilian pre-2022 Electins Scenario, a partnership between RAPS and FBSP, based on data collected by Datafolha through a sample of 2,100 people interviewed between August 3 and 13, 2022, advances toward what has been debated in the public forum about democracy, rights and authoritarianism. In this process, if it is possible to identify one highlight result, what is revealed is the weight of the fear of violence, especially that of political nature, due to the characterization of the institutional political scenario the country has lived through the last few years. This study will show, with data and robust statistics technique, that violence and conflict inciting speech, as well manifestations of violence, ultimately encourage precisely the antidemocratic positions by the population, resulting in support for extreme measures against institutions as a way out for public safety problems.

Violence and fear are the fundamental analytical keys for understanding current Brazilian society. It is true that Brazil



THE EQUIVALENT TO 5.3 MILLION PEOPLE (3.2% OF RESPONDENTS) DECLARED HAVING BEEN VICTIMS OF THREATS DUE TO THEIR POLITICAL POSITIONS BETWEEN JULY 3 AND AUGUST 3, 2022. has observed, since 2018, according to data from the Brazilian Public Safety Forum, a drop in the number of Intentional Violent Deaths. However, beyond the drops in homicides, countless other data reinforce the notion that we live in a violent and fearful society. And that fear does not appear to be disconnected from reality: if we extrapolate the data extracted from the sampling of respondents heard by the research proportionally to the Brazilian population aged 16 years or more, we will have, for example, that the equivalent of 5.3 million people (3.2% of respondents) declared having been the victims of threats because of their political positions in the thirty days prior to the field of the research.

In terms of empiric results and data obtained, it is worth remembering that the fear of violence and authoritarianism in Brazil, executed for the first time by FBSP in 2017, had the main objective of measuring the propensity of the Brazilian population to support authoritarian positions and the impact of the fear of crime and violence in the escalation of this scenario, assuming that the advance in debate and in public safety policy plays a fundamental role in strengthening citizenship and democracy in the country. In 2017, the level of propensity for supporting authoritarian positions, in a scale from 0 to 10 was 8.10, indicating a high level of adhesion to authoritarian values, which seemed to be confirmed in the results of the 2018 elections, leading an extreme right-wing politician, with a clearly autocratic speech, to head the Executive Branch.

In 2022, the research, conducted in a partnership with the Political Action Network for Sustainability (RAPS), is updated and expanded in its analysis dimension. It presents some good news: the democracy-propensity rate was 7.25, considered high, and more than half the respondents scored above 7 in the index. In a scenario of constant tensions and threats to democracy and speech that seek to seed doubt relative to the safety of electronic voting machines and to the integrity of the elections process, highest support to statements concerning democracy are focused on the importance and respect for election results: 89.3% of respondents say that "The people choosing their leaders in free and transparent elections is essential to democracy". This data is fundamental for measuring adherence of the population to these speeches, showing they support democracy and the right to vote. On that same trend, 88.1% say whoever wins on the ballot and recognized by the Elections Judiciary must be invested, which indicates high confidence by voters in the electoral process.

Considering that democracy is not limited to the right to vote, support to the population's participation in democratic processes is expressive: 88.5% agree that "The people having an active voice and participating in the main governmental decisions is essential to democracy". In terms of recognition of the importance of democratic institutions and balance between Branches of Power, 62.8% agree that "It is important to democracy that courts are able to prevent the executive to act beyond its authority". Considering that one of the pillars of the current administration is engaging in recurring attacks on the Judicial Branch, focused on the Supreme Court and on the Superior Elections Court, the results show these measures have not resonated on over half the population. The Propensity for Supporting Authoritarian Positions Index dropped if compared to the previous poll, and this year is 7,29.

When observed all three dimensions that comprise the index, we see the drop was driven, especially by "conventionalism", although there is a significant increase in the "authoritarian aggressiveness" dimension. In 2017, this last dimension recorded a 6.50 index, which reached 7.11 in 2022. The relation between authoritarianism and the fear of violence, which was already visible in 2017, becomes even more important in the current scenario, marked by exacerbated political polarization and by the speech inciting radicalization of several themes surrounding public safety. THESE PHENOMENA MAY HELP EXPLAIN OR REASSERT THE IMPORTANCE OF BUILDING SERIOUS PUBLIC SAFETY POLICY FOR REESTABLISHING CITIZENSHIP AND THE TRUST OF THE POPULATION RELATIVE TO ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS FOR CRIME AND VIOLENCE. Whereas the trend toward authoritarian positions dropped, the fear of violence grew since 2017. In a value ranging from 0 (no fear) to 1 (great fear), Brazil records a fear of violence index of 0.76, (0.68 in 2017). This scenario of increased fear of crime and violence is taking place in the midst of a period of lower rates of intentional violent deaths in the country, which, however, has not been translated in a perception of safety by the population. The constant capturing of agendas close to public safety that played a major role in the 2018 elections, became one of the core pillars of the narrative used by the current administration, which happens both on a personal level and on a State violence level. Exploration of fear became a political weapon and seems to prevent Brazilian society to enjoy moment of reduction of some violence indices, still, thus compromising its perception on rights and citizenship.

Examples of that are defense of civilian armament and the speech focused only on police force (often lethal) as a solution for violence, which ultimately encourage attacks on guarantees of rights and institutions, in mediating conflicts. In the current research, the fear of being a victim of armed groups (drug dealers, militias and gun slingers) is at 83.9% of respondents, with 73.9% of respondents saying they are very afraid. The fear of violence by Militarized Police Forces has grew: it is at 63.8% of respondents, compared to 59.5% in 2017. I.e., the capture of public safe agenda happens when the speech that claims to present solutions for criminality reveals to be theoretical, not backed by any concrete project to convince society. We must also highlight that despite the authoritarian rhetoric and exploitation of public safety policy, more than 60% (66.4%) of respondents say safety will not improve by arming the population.

These phenomena may help explain or reassert the importance of building serious public safety policy for reestablishing citizenship and the trust of the population relative to alternative solutions for crime and violence. The trend to supporting authoritarian positions in 2022, as in 2017, is higher among



those fearing violence (7.48 score) than among those less fearful (7.16). Considering that the "authoritarian aggressiveness" dimension grew, it is possible to say that violence and conflict-inciting speeches, as well as manifestations of violence ultimately encourage precisely antidemocratic positions by the population, resulting in support to external measures against institutions as way to handle public safety problems.

There is, moreover, a new aspect in the current socio-political context affecting this perception: political-partisan violence. Speech encouraging political and institutional aggressiveness has been common, having even reached to the point of lethal violence by civilians, in recent episodes. Among respondents in 2022, 67.5% claim to be afraid of being physically attacked due to their political or partisan choices. In a victimization poll, 3.2% claim to have been victims of threats, for political reasons, in the last month alone. If the poll sample is extrapolated, that would mean 5.3 million people who were victims of threats due to their political positions in the 30 days prior to the research time frame¹.

As for the influence of socio-demographic characteristics in support to authoritarian positions, it is possible to see a change in behavior, compared to 2017: the propensity among young people, aged 16 to 24 was the second highest in 2017, only lower than in the population aged 45+. In 2022, the age rage of the young demographic presents a lower tendency toward authoritarianism, and was the one with the sharpest drop in the index (from 8.1 in 2017 to 7.1 in 2022). That means that the appeal of the authoritarian speech, which used to resonate among the younger demographic, lost its punch.

The support for civil, human and social rights brings a challenge: the index dropped between 2017 and 2022: 7.8 and 7.6 respectively. However, there are some highlights: 83.4% recognize there is racism in Brazil; in 2017, that number was 70% (who considered that there were only class differences


1. Period from July 3 to August 3, 2022. THIS YEAR, 83.4% OF RESPONDENTS RECOGNIZE THERE IS RACISM IN BRAZIL; IN 2017, THAT NUMBER WAS 70% IN 2017, AND 82% SUPPORT THE DEMARCATION OF INDIGENOUS LAND. in Brazil, but not racism). I.e., there was an improvement in the perception about a marker that is pungent in violence and inequality in Brazil. Another surprising piece of data is the support of 82% of respondents to the demarcation of indigenous land. The Amazonian Region in the Country stood out in terms of violence in the last years, becoming a point of intersection between organized crime and environmental crimes. The recent international repercussion of violence in the Amazonian region and the increase in the rates of deforestation and natural disasters related to the climate question are bringing the issue closer to the daily concerns of the remainder of the country, granting the environmental agenda growing relevance.

When we cross support to the rights agenda and fear of violence, however, we find something interesting and counterintuitive: those with the most fear of violence<u>tend to be more</u> favorable to the rights agenda - Index - 7.7. Among those with the less fear of suffering violence, the index is 7,2. This relation can also serve as basis for understanding, as suggested before, that resorting to authoritarian aggressiveness is not the only solution expected by the population for the fear of crime and violence. There is room for dispute for the enforcement of public safety policy that values rights and due process of Law, without being necessary to take the authoritarian path. This means that: if those with more fear tend to show greater support for rights, and, at the same time, also show greater support to authoritarian tendencies, we may consider there is a field of opportunity for the development of public safety policy that will placate fear, and may result in decreasing the level of authoritarianism in the future.



1

PROPENSITY FOR DEMOCRACY



Democracy and results analysis methodology

Beyond democracy on an institutional level, it is also necessary seeing it on a cultural level, as well as its values disseminated to the population. Scientific literature has been diving, throughout several decades, on the importance of democratic culture, and it is emphatic in saying a democracy without democratic citizens is destined to failure (Almond and Verba, 1989; Diamond, 1994; Inglehart and Welzel, 2009). Recent studies confirm not only the relevance of democratic culture in the survival of democracies, but also defend the understanding of the mechanisms that lead to that, underscoring that public support to democracy is capable of fending off authoritarian leaders (Claassen, 2020; Graham and Svolik, 2020).

Through the Propensity for Democracy Index, developed for the first time in this research, the goal was to identify, on an aggregate manner, how much people are willing to support democratic values, such as respect for institutions and laws on the books, separation of powers, the electoral process, individual liberties and human rights.

The Propensity for Democracy Index was developed for measuring the current level of adhesion of Brazilians to democracy and it is based on a set of seven items, a battery of twelve statements that address different aspects of the democratic regime. This is an index of agreement where the higher the agreement levels of the individual to the statement in the item, the higher the adhesion to democracy, except for items 1, 2 and 7, whose logic is reversed (the lower the agreement, the higher the adhesion) and which refer, respectively, to: "For managing to arrest criminals, there are occasions when authorities may act outside the bounds of the law", "When there is a crisis situation, it does not matter for the government to go over the law, Congress or institutions for the purpose of resolving the problems", and "In some cases, it would be justified for the military to support or take power through a Coup". **PROPENSITY FOR** DEMOCRACYINDEX. **DEVELOPED IN A PIONEERING WAY** IN THIS RESEARCH. SOUGHT TO IDENTIFY. IN AGGREGATE. HOW **MUCH PEOPLE HAVE A PROPENSITY TO** SUPPORT DEMOCRATIC VALUES. SUCH AS RESPECT FOR **INSTITUTIONS AND** LAWS ONTHE BOOKS. SEPARATION OF **POWERS AND PUBLIC RIGHTS AND POWERS.** ELECTORAL PROCESS. INDIVIDIAL LIBERTIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS.

Most of the items was extracted or adapted based on similar questions found in some of the most consolidated research in the field of studies of democracy, such as *Latin American Public Opinion Project – LAPOP* (Items 2, 3 and 7) and *World Values Survey – WVS* (Items 4, 5 and 6), allowing comparison of the answers obtained by the current application with other compiled by this traditional research.

STATEMENTS USED TO MEASURE THE DEGREE OF PROPENSITY FOR DEMOCRACY IN THE BRAZILIAN POPULATION (AGED 16 AND OVER)

 In order to successfully arrest criminals, there are occasions when the authorities may act without respecting the law.

30X

- 2. When there is a crisis situation, it doesn't matter if the government bypasses laws, Congress or institutions in order to solve the problems.
- **3.** Despite having some problems, democracy is preferable to any other form of government.
- 4. The people choosing their leaders in free and transparent elections is essential for democracy.
- The people having an active voice and participating in key government decisions is essential for democracy.
- 6. Human rights being respected is essential for democracy

- In some cases it would be justifiable for the military to support or seize power through a Coup d'état.
- 8. Whoever is declared the winner of the elections by the Electoral Justice must be sworn in on January 1st.
- **9.** The electoral process for choosing representatives in Brazil is very satisfactory.
- **10.** The separation of the three branches of power (Executive, Legislative and Judicial) in Brazil is very satisfactory.
- It is important for democracy that the courts are able to prevent the government from acting beyond its authority,
- 12. The secret budget, which is the non-transparent transfer of public funds to electoral strongholds, harms democracy in Brazil


STATEMENTS CONSIDERED IN BUILDING THE PROPENSITY FOR DEMOCRACY INDEX

- In order to successfully arrest criminals, there are occasions when the authorities may act without respecting the law.
- When there is a crisis situation, it doesn't matter if the government bypasses laws, Congress or institutions in order to solve the problems.
- **3.** Despite having some problems, democracy is preferable to any other form of government.
- People choosing their leaders in free and transparent elections is essential for democracy.

- The people having an active voice and participating in key government decisions is essential for democracy.
- Whoever is declared the winner of the elections by the Electoral Justice must be sworn in on January 1st.
- It is important for democracy that the courts are able to prevent the government from acting beyond its authority.

The choice of the seven items for building the Propensity for Democracy Index respected two main criteria: recurrence in the building of correlated indicators and consistency pattern in responses. First, it was based on literature, to see what items are absolutely essential for building questions on democracy. Moreover, was taken into consideration in which items the frequency oscillates, irrespective of the pattern of responses to correlated items. Overall, the five excluded items present a low consistency rate.²

Chart 1 shows frequencies of all items contained in the battery, including those that did not make into the composition of the index, for increasing the level of transparency of the exercise. 2. The causes should be identified based on more systematic analysis of the items. The possibility of testing them in future exercises is suggested, promoting small changes in the wording of the questions.



The respondent's answers were analyzed in three levels. The first level comprehends the results and analysis of the questions individually, considering the options of answers percentiles. Questions 1, 2 and 7 indicate that the higher the level of disagreement, the more democratic the answer will be. The other questions have the meaning reversed, i.e., higher agreement implies higher support to democratic values.

The second level corresponds to building an indicator capable of producing analysis on an aggregate level, i.e., considering the group of questions. The strategy used was selection the questions that could be replicated in future rounds of application of the questionnaire and to identify, comparatively through time, the behavior of Brazilians concerning their propensity to democracy. Therefore, seven questions were considered (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8 and 11) for developing the index. The Likert Scale options received weighted values (weights 1 to 6). For example, a respondent who strongly agreed to all questions would sum a 60 points total, which, divided by 10, would result in a score of 6.0, recording the maximum score int he Propensity for Democracy Index. In light of that, the values were normalized to a scale from 0 (maximum rejection of democracy) to 10.0 (maximum propensity).

The last level of analysis presents the Propensity for Democracy Indicator by items related to the respondent's profile: sex, age, income, socioeconomic class, education, race/ color, religion, region, nature of the municipality or size of the municipality.

On the first level of individual analysis of the questions, we note than in 4 of the 12 items, agreement was the option of at least 80% of respondents. Three of these items are directly related to the need for the political regime to preserve citizen participation in collective decision-making processes. More specifically, this result can be read as a sign of support for the THE RESULTS OF THE PROPENSITY FOR DEMOCRACY INDEX WAS POSITIVE AND REACHED 7.25 ON THE SCALE. THE SCORE IS CONSIDERED HIGH, ESPECIALLY BECAUSE MORE THAN HALF THE RESPONDENTS SCORED 7 POINTS OR ABOVE, IN A SCALE FROM 0 TO 10. holding of free and transparent elections and respect for the results expressed on the ballot: 89% of respondents agree with the need for the people to choose their leaders in free and transparent elections. And 88% agree that whoever is declared the winner of the elections by the Elections' Court must be sworn in on January 1st.

A second block of items records a level of around 60% of opinions favorable to democratic values. Altogether, these items reflect the opinion of the population about the preservation of fundamental standards for the rule of law and direct support for democracy. In it, just over 62% of respondents consider it important for the democratic regime that the courts are able to prevent the government from acting beyond its authority. A similar level disagrees with the possibility of the military taking power under some justification. Furthermore, it is worth noting that 67.38% of respondents point to the secret budget as harmful to democracy and 59.95% declare support for democracy, even though the regime has some problems.

Finally, 4 of the 12 items split the opinion of respondents. Only 45.10% said they agreed with the declaration of broad satisfaction with the electoral process for choosing representatives in Brazil. Only 36.33% said they were very satisfied with the separation of the three branches of power in the country. Furthermore, the population is divided on the possibility of taking action in spite of the laws, whether it be for arresting criminals or to stopping crises. Overall, items 1, 2, 9 and 10 require positions that may sound extreme ("very satisfactory"), or ask for fighting the trade-off³, which was perceived as the main reasons for respondents to be split when answering them.

With the sum of the seven selected items, it was understood that it was possible measuring the opinion of the population on the Brazilian political regime. Table 1 and Chart 2 present the main descriptive measures of the index built.

3. Choices where an option is made by alternative necessarily negatively impacts another. It is considered that fighting trade-off is adequate exercise for measuring opinions, therefore, despite the split in opinions, the items were included in building the index.

TABLE 1

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE PROPENSITY FOR DEMOCRACY INDEX - BRAZIL, 2022

PROPENSITY FOR DEMOCRACY INDEX


(Itens 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8 and 11)

| Descriptive statistics | | | | | |
|--------------------------|----------------|-------|--|--|--|
| Mean | 7.251 | | | | |
| 95% Confidence Interval | Lower limit | 7,195 | | | |
| for the Mean | Upper limit | 7,306 | | | |
| 5% of the trimmed mean | 7,305 | | | | |
| Mean | 7,38 | | | | |
| Variation | 1,683 | | | | |
| Standard Deviation | 1,297 | | | | |
| Minimum | 0 | | | | |
| Maximum | 10 | | | | |
| Amplitude | 10 | | | | |
| Inter-quartile amplitude | 1,429 | | | | |
| Asymmetry | -1,078 | | | | |
| Kurtosis | 4,232 | | | | |

The average of the index was 7.25 with a standard deviation of 1.29 points, which signals a higher propensity toward democracy. Based on a mean analysis (7.38 points), we may identify that half the respondents scored higher than seven points in the index. That scenario is reinforced by the analysis of the response frequency histogram, which allows us to observe that:

CHART 2

HISTOGRAM OF FREQUENCIES OF THE PROPENSITY FOR DEMOCRACY INDEX



- 1. Ninety-four point seventy-six percent (94.76%) of respondents have a score at most two standard deviations from the mean, above or below it;
- 2. Fifty point twenty-four percent (50.24%) of respondents scored equal or higher than the average;
- 3. only 4.05% scored below 5 points (half the scale).

Taken as a whole, these results make clear the low heterogeneity of the sample and, especially, the concentration of respondents in high scores (above 5 points) that represent a greater propensity for democracy.

The greatest support for statements concerning democracy is found in the importance of elections: 89.3% agree that "The people choosing their leaders in free and transparent elections is essential for democracy", followed by support for the participation of the population in democratic processes, 88.5% agree that "The people having an active voice and participating in the main government decisions is essential for democracy". Moreover, 88.1% say that whoever wins on the ballot and is recognized by Elections' Court must be sworn in, whereas 62.8% agree that "It is important for democracy that the courts are able to stop the government from acting


that the courts are able to stop the government from a beyond its authority".

EAmong those interviewed, 67.4% recognize that the transfer of resources without transparency to electoral strongholds, called "secret budget", is harmful to democracy. In this statement, it is worth noting that 17.4% of respondents disagree that this is a threat to democracy. Another surprising fact is that 33.2% of respondents consider that there are occasions when the authorities can act without respecting the law. One of the hypotheses that justify this high number concerns the recent period of fighting the Covid-19 pandemic.


Impact of socio-demographic variables in the Propensity for Democracy Index

Sex, Age Range and Education Level

Variables such as sex and age group did not show substantially relevant differences. Women have a lower propensity for democracy with an index of 7.15, which is below the general average (7.25). However, the difference in relation to men is small and stays below a 01-point range. The same is true for the age group, in which people aged 60 or over had an index of 7.10 points. It is worth noting that the other age groups are close to the average, especially individuals between the ages of 25-34 and 35-44 years, who scored slightly above this level (7.31 and 7.34 respectively).




Education level, on its turn, does seems to make a difference, and the propensity for democracy grows according to the level of education. This means that individuals who have, at most, incomplete elementary education are the least prone to democracy, with an average of 6.67 points. The opposite happens with those who have the maximum level of education, i.e., graduate degrees, who scored 8.22 points on average. From one extreme to the other, the propensity for democracy grows by 1.54 points, equivalent to 15.40%, considering all points on the scale (0-10). We might say that males aged between 35 and 44 with a graduate degree are more prone to democracy.



Income, Socioeconomic Class, Race/Color and Religion

Individuals with the highest income are also the most prone to democracy: in this group, the average reaches 7.82. On the other hand, individuals who have an income of up to one Minimum Monthly Wage score 6.90 points, below the general average (7.25). However, it is important to note that the difference between the highest and lowest average by income range is below 1 point.



The variation is slightly higher when considering social class. Individuals in Class A recorded an average propensity toward democracy of 8.02 points, as opposed to 6.86 of individuals in classes D/E, who have the lowest propensity for democracy.

As in income, there is a successive increase in the propensity for democracy from the less favored social classes to the more favored ones. As for race/color, the difference is very small, within a maximum of 5 tenths from the most prone (Whites) to the least prone (Others) to democracy.

Finally, the difference between the averages of the religions is repeated in this scenario. All have averages close to the general average (7.25), slightly above or below this level, but very close to each other.







Region, Municipality Size and Municipality Nature


In the regional analysis, all regions of the country recorded averages very close to the general average, showing that there is a certain homogeneity of support for democracy in the Brazilian territory.

In the analysis by size of municipalities, those with the largest population (> 200 thousand) showed greater support for democracy (7.38). When comparing the results of the capitals with municipalities in the metropolitan region and countryside areas, there are no significant differences in how populations relate to democracy.



2.

INDEX OF PROPENSITY FOR SUPPORTING AUTHORITARIAN POSITIONS



Authoritarianism, F Scale and methodology of analysis of results

Authoritarianism is based on a set of ideas cast by an authority figure that is linked to tradition and the use of violence to solve problems (Adorno, 1950). The authoritarian figure passed to be measured with national representativity as of 2017, which is a democratic advance in mapping authoritarian tendencies in the Country (Brazilian Public Safety Forum, 2017). The instrument used was the Fascism Scale, also known as the F Scale, created by Theodor Adorno and other collaborators in 1950 in post-Second World Germany.

According to Professor Crochik (2017), Adorno's foundations served to better understand the characteristics of the authoritarian personality. This personality is linked to an ideology contrary to the common good, to social minorities (such as women, the poorest people, the LGBTQIAP+ population, IN black and indigenous people, people with disabilities, among other groups) 2017, and to thoughts outside the common pattern of the majority group (Lavor et al., 2018). Authoritarian positions are structured along three dimensions. According to Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro (1991), in Brazil authoritarianism feeds from the polarization between different social groups.

Regarding the authoritarian personality, Erich Fromm (1983) understands that people have an ambivalent orientation towards authority and power (Fromm, 1983). An authoritarian person can be both dominant and submissive. This last characteristic refers to submission to an idolized power figure. The dominating aspect, on the other hand, refers to a position of dominating superiority regarding social groups that are considered inferior. Therefore, the F Scale that maps the authoritarian personality consists of three dimensions: THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY PASSED TO BE MEASURED WITH NATIONAL REPRESENTATIVITY IN BRAZIL AS OF 2017, AND IT IS A DEMOCRATIC ADVANCE IN MAPPING AUTHORITARIAN TENDENCIES IN BRAZIL.

- Conventionalism: which is adherence to the traditional values and conventions of society;
- Submission to authority: referring to unconditional acceptance to a leadership recognized as legitimate;
- Authoritarian aggressiveness: that being the predisposition to hostility against minorities.

Overall, 2,100 people participated in the survey, making up a statistically representative sample of the Brazilian population aged 16 and over, in about 130 small, medium and large municipalities, between August 3 and 13, 2022. The poll's margin of error is plus or minus 2.0 points, considering a 95% confidence interval.

The research made use of personal approach techniques with respondents in population flow points based on questionnaires structured in six levels of agreement relative to the sentences. The version of the Scale F used, composed of 15 statements, was answered using the following grades of agreement: strongly agree, agree, partially agree, partially disagree, disagree, and *strongly disagree*. Therefore, the response levels range from 1 to 6, and these scores were used for creating the Index of Propensity for supporting Authoritarian Positions. This Index corresponds to a ranking of 1 to 10 points: the closer to 1, the lower the support for authoritarian positions, and the closer to 10, the greater the adhesion and support to them. The overall reliability of the scale was good, with a Cronbach's Alpha of 0.779 and McDonald's Omega of 0.782, values close to those found in previous polls, like the one taken in 2017 (0.824) and in the study conducted by Crochík (2005).

BOX 3

STATEMENTS USED FOR SIZING THE LEVEL OF PROPENSITY FOR SUPPORTING AUTHORITARIAN POSITIONS IN THE BRAZILIAN POPULATION (16 YEARS OF AGE OR MORE), BY DIMENSION



SUBMISSION To Authority

What this country needs, above all, before laws or political plans, is some brave, tireless and dedicated leaders in whom the people can put their faith.

Obedience and respect for authority are the main virtues we must teach our children.

There's nothing worse than a person who doesn't feel deep love, gratitude and respect for their parents.

No decent, normal person in their right mind would think of offending a friend or close relative

AUTHORITARIAN Aggressiveness

CONVENTIONALISM

| If we talked less and worked more, we would all be better off. | Men can be divided into two well-defined classes: the weak and the strong. |
|---|--|
| Every insult to our honor must always be punished. | An bad-mannered, impolite individual with bad customs can hardly make friends with decent people. |
| Sexual crimes such as rape or attacks on children deserve more than imprisonment; whoever commits these crimes should receive public physical punishment or receive a worse punishment. | We must all have absolute faith in a supernatural power whose decisions we must abide by. |
| Homosexuals are almost criminals and should receive severe punishment. | |

Sometimes young people have rebellious ideas that, over the years, they will have to overcome to calm their thoughts.

Currently, people increasingly meddle in matters that should only be personal and private.

Each of the items was analyzed based on the degrees of agreement and disagreement. To obtain the percentages, responses "strongly agree" and "agree" were added for agreement with the statement, and "strongly disagree" and "disagree" to the disagreement percentage. Consequently, the structure of agreement of the items that make up Scale F are found in Chart 13.


CHART 13

PROPENSITY FOR SUPPORTING **AUTHORITARIAN** POSITIONS, BY STATEMENT AND BY DIMENSION (AGREE AND DISAGREE. IN %) -**BRAZIL**, 2022





STRONGLY AGREE +



The highest percentages of agreement are found in the statements: "Obedience and respect for authority are the main virtues that we must teach our children" (85% – Submission to Authority Dimension), "If we talked less and worked more, we would all be better (81.4% – Authoritarian aggressiveness)", and "There is nothing worse than a person who does not feel deep love, gratitude and respect for his parents" (80.8%% – Submission to Authority Dimension).

As for the highest levels of disagreement, they were observed in the following items: "Homosexuals are almost criminals and should receive severe punishment" (75.2% – Authoritarian aggressiveness), "Men can be divided into two defined classes: the weak and the strong" (41.2% – Conventionalism), and "An individual with bad manners, bad customs and bad education can hardly make friends with decent people" (26.6% – Conventionalism).


Comparisons were also made between the percentages of agreement and disagreement between the 2017 and 2022 samples. The biggest difference between the levels of agreement was in the statement "We should always punish any insult to our honor" (Authoritarian Aggressiveness), which increased the level of agreement from 45% in 2017 to 55% in 2022. The biggest difference between the levels of disagreement was in the statement "Men can be divided into two defined classes: the weak and the strong" (Conventionalism), which in 2017 represented 33.7% and in 2022 presented 41.2% % of people disagreeing with this statement.

In addition to the analysis of specific items, a Propensity for Supporting Authoritarian Positions Index was created based on Scale F. To do that, a simple average of the items of Scale F was taken. With that average, the Index corresponds to a 0 to 10 score, presenting the different estimated levels of support of authoritarianism: ESTIMATED LEVEL OF PROPENSITY TO SUPPORT AUTHORITARIAN POSITIONS



THE MEAN SCORE OF THE INDEX OF PROPENSITY FOR SUPPORTING AUTHORITARIAN POSITIONS WAS 7.29, BELOW THE 8.10 AVERAGE IDENTIFIED IN 2017. The mean score of the Propensity Index to support authoritarian positions was 7.29, lower than the average of 8.10 found in 2017, which can be considered an indication of a decrease in adherence to authoritarianism. However, despite its decline, this index still represents a strong degree of support for authoritarian positions.

In 2022, the average support for authoritarian positions presented by the F Scale was 7.29, a value 10% lower than the 8.10 found in 2017. When analyzing the specific dimensions of authoritarianism, it is noted that, as in 2017, Submission to Authority is the category with the highest score. However, there was an increase in the Authoritarian Aggressiveness scores, but there was also a decrease in Submission to Authority and in Conventionalism. The average Submission to authority went from 8.08 in 2017 to 7.97 in 2022, which, still indicates the continued adherence to statements related to obedience and the need for an authoritarian leader. As far as it is concerned, the Conventionalism score decreased from 7.36 in 2017 to 6.91 in 2022, indicating a reduction in adherence to statements linked to traditionalist values. Adherence to the issues contained in the dimensions for 2022 is shown in Chart 14.



The observation of variations by dimension reveals, therefore, that the drop in the index between 2017 and 2022 was driven by Submission to Authority and Conventionalism. The Authoritarian Aggressiveness dimension was the only one that grew compared to 2017. Therefore, despite the drop, there was an increase in authoritarian aggressiveness, which contained the possibility of an even lower index of propensity to support authoritarian positions. In 2017, this last dimension recorded a 6.50 index, which reached 7.11 in 2022.



| BOX 5 | SCORES CALCULATE THE INDEX OF PROPI AUTHORITARIAN POS 2017 AND 2022 | ENSITY TO SUPPORT | |
|--------------|--|-------------------|---------------------------------|
| | SUBMISSION To Authority | CONVENTIONALISM | AUTHORITARIAN Aggressiveness |
| 2017 AVERAGE | 8,08 | 7,36 | 6,50 |
| 2022 AVERAGE | 7,97 | 6,91 | 7,11 |

Another point to be highlighted was the increase in disagreement, which had more impact on the decrease in the index than the increase in agreement. The comparison of the two surveys, by statement and dimension, can be seen in chart 15. PROPENSITY FOR SUPPORTING AUTHORITARIAN POSITIONS, BY STATEMENT AND BY DIMENSION (AGREE AND DISAGREE, IN %) – BRAZIL, 2017 AND 2022

SUBMISSION TO Authority

There's nothing worse than a person who doesn't feel deep love, gratitude, and respect for their parents.



Obedience and respect for authority are the main virtues we must teach our children.



AUTHORITARIAN Aggression


Nowadays, people increasingly meddle in matters that should only be personal and private.




If we talked less and worked more, we would all be better off.




What this country needs, above all, before laws or political plans, is some brave, tireless and dedicated leaders in whom the people can put their faith.




No decent, normal person in their right mind would think of offending a friend or close relative.



Sexual crimes such as rape or attacks on children deserve more than imprisonment; whoever commits these crimes should receive public physical punishment or receive a worse punishment.



Sometimes young people have rebellious ideas that, over the years, they will have to overcome in order to calm their thoughts.






DISAGREE + STRONGLY DISAGREE 2017 DISAGREE + STRONGLY DISAGREE 2022



AGREE + STRONGLY AGREE 2017 AGREE + STRONGLY AGREE 2022

Most of our social problems would be solved if we could get rid of immoral people, outcasts and perverts.



Every insult to our honor must always be punished.



CONVENTIONALISM


Science has its place, but there are many important things that the human mind can never understand.




We must all have absolute faith in a supernatural power whose decisions we must abide by.

75


77.7



Homosexuals are almost criminals and should receive severe punishment.



An bad-mannered, impolite individual with bad customs can hardly make friends with decent people.



Men can be divided into two well-defined classes: the weak and the strong.




The influence of demographic and social variables

Sociodemographic aspects also influence adherence to authoritarian positions. Therefore, the Index of Propensity for Supporting Authoritarian Positions has also been analyzed comparatively considering sociodemographic variables presented in this section, emphasizing changes occurred between 2017 and 2022.

Age group


As in 2017, people over 45 are the most likely to support authoritarian positions, a rate that grows with age. However, it is observed that the greatest reduction in authoritarianism occurred among young people aged 16 to 24 (from 8.1 in 2017 to 7.1 in 2022), making this group the one with the lowest score in 2022. In 2017, the propensity for support among young people in this age group was the second highest, second only to that of the population over 45 years old. The data suggests that the appeal of authoritarian discourse, which found an echo among younger people, has significantly lost strength in recent years.



Race/color

Although the has no been statistically significant difference between adhesion to authoritarian positions by race/color, we note that the sharpest drops between 2017 and 2022 happened in the black population. Both black and brown people showed a 1-point reduction in the average support for authoritarian positions.






Sexual orientation


The lowest propensity to support authoritarian positions is found among bisexual people (6.5), followed by homosexuals (6.7), who are far from the average of heterosexuals (7.3). PEOPLE WITH COLLEGE AND GRADUATE DEGREES HAVE LOWER RATES WHEN COMPARED TO OTHER LEVELS OF EDUCATION.





Level of education

As for education levels, there is a relationship between an increase in education and a decrease in the average propensity to support authoritarian positions. People with college and graduate degrees have lower rates when compared to other levels of education. In 2022, from illiterate people to people with incomplete higher education have very similar rates of propensity to authoritarian positions, becoming more homogeneous groups despite the difference in education. Significant differences occur between the group of people with postgraduate degrees and other educational levels.




Socioeconomic Class

Following the general population average, there was a decrease in the propensity to support authoritarian positions among all socioeconomic classes. Classes D/E, although continuing to present the highest average together with the C2 class, was the one that had the greatest reduction in authoritarianism compared to 2017, with a decrease of 1.1 points.

SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES **ARE OBSERVED BETWEEN THE** NORTHEAST AND THE SOUTH. WITH THE NORTHEAST **PRESENTING THE HIGHER AVERAGE:** AND. MARGINALLY. **BETWEEN THE** NORTHEAST AND SOUTHEAST.WITH NORTHFAST PRESENTING THE **HIGHER AVERAGE.**


CHART 20

MEANS OF THE INDEX OF PROPENSITY FOR SUPPORTING AUTHORITARIAN POSITIONS, BY ECONOMIC CLASS - BRASIL, 2017 AND 2022




Region

The averages of the different regions of the country followed the trend of decreasing propensity to authoritarianism compared to 2017. South and Southeast had the lowest averages (7.1 and 7.2 respectively), with the South showing the sharpest drop in the index compared to 2017 (1.1 points). Significant differences are observed between the Northeast and the South, with the Northeast having the highest average; and marginally between Northeast and Southeast, with Northeast showing the highest average. However, this result only occurred because there is an age or socioeconomic differences among the sampled regions. A rapid test correcting for the effect of age nullified this significant difference (ANCOVA).




Size of the municipality and Nature of the municipality

When comparing the capital, metropolitan region and countryside, people residing in capitals have a lower average propensity for authoritarian positions (7.0) compared to those residing in metropolitan and countryside regions (both with an average of 7.3). Similarly, the larger the municipality, the less support for authoritarian positions; and small and medium-sized municipalities had significantly higher averages than large-sized ones.



Religion

This is the first time that the impact of religion in supporting authoritarian positions has been measured, considering the Brazilian context in which religious issues are mixed with political moralities and electorates are in dispute. The highest averages of propensity for authoritarian positions are among Catholics and Evangelicals and Neo-Pentecostals (both with an average of 7.4). The lowest averages are among people of African origin religions, other religions (average 7.0 for both), and those without religion who, with an average of 6.8, have the lowest propensity to support authoritarian positions.



Fear of violence and victimization

The influence that fear of violence exerts on the propensity to support authoritarian positions was one of the main motivators for the development of the Index of Propensity to support Authoritarian Positions by the FBSP in 2017. Historically, Brazil has been marked by different types of violence, whether those related to everyday social relations, organized crime or the action of the State in the fight against crime. If in 2017 there were already civil and democratic deficits associated with a scenario of fear and insecurity that could threaten institutions, the social and political context in 2022 is even more serious. The role of public safety policy, which has been neglected becomes evident when we see that the rhetoric on the theme is weaponized for leveraging antidemocratic positions, mobilizing cultural elements based on fear, lack of safety and violence, and supported by disinformation. The fear of crime and violence remains a challenge in building alternative political projects and can serve as a measure to understand the scenarios that have been taking shape in the country since the last time these indices were calculated, in 2017.

The methodological and analytical tool used for measuring the weight of the fear of violence in the scale used for building the index of Propensity for supporting Authoritarian Positions was a 12-question battery applied in the same poll conducted by Datafolha Institute, which also served as basis for other indices used in this publication. Based on the results of these questions, a Fear of Violence Index was developed, later crossed with the Index of Propensity to Support Authoritarian Positions and the Index of Support for the Civil, Human and Social Rights Agenda. The statements applied are shown in the following table: FEAR OF CRIME AND VIOLENCE CONTINUES TO BE A CHALLENGE IN BUILDING ALTERNATIVE POLITICAL PRO-JECTS AND MAY SERVE AS A MEASURE TO UNDERSTAND THE SCENARIOS THAT HAVE BEEN BEEN DRAWN IN THE COUNTRY. WHEN USED FOR SIZING THE LEVEL OF FEAR OF VIOLENCE IN BRAZILIAN POPULATION. "WOULD YOU SAY YOU ARE AFRAID OF..."

- Engaging in fights or physical assaults with other people
- · Dying by homicide
- Being kidnapped
- Being a victim of rape
- $\boldsymbol{\cdot}$ Being a victim of a scam and
- · losing money through your cell phone
- Having your cell phone robbed or stolen
- Being a victim of violence by the Militarized Police Force, the one that carries out uniformed and ostensible policing on the streets
- Being a victim of violence by the Civil Police, the one that investigates crimes and registers occurrences in the police stations
- Being a victim of armed groups (traffickers, militias and gun slingers)
- · Having your personal data leaked online
- Being physically attacked for political or partisan choice
- Being threatened due to political or party choice

Based on these procedures, the "fear of violence index" was calculated from the sum of the 12 items divided by 12, so that the index varies between 0 and 1, where 0 means not being afraid of suffering any type of violence, and 1 corresponds to being afraid of suffering all types of violence. Thus, the higher the index value, the greater the number of violence that the respondent is afraid of suffering. In the operationalization of this measure of fear of violence, the answers to the 12 statements in Box 1 were used and recoded to values that allowed a variation between 0 and 1 (0 = No 1 = Yes). As a consequence, we observed in the sample used an average score in the fear of violence of 0.76, which reveals a moderate level of the fear of violence.

However, in addition to the average, which can often hide more complex aspects, the sample was divided by quartiles, i.e., groups corresponding to 25% of the sampled population each. For example, the first quartile refers to the 25% of individuals with the least fear, while the fourth quartile refers to the 25% most fearful in the sample. Therefore, in the disaggregated analysis of the sample, it was noticed that there is no group that is not positioned, at least to an intermediate degree, in a field of fear of violence, in other words: all groups are afraid of violence in the country. There is no group that is not afraid of violence.

In order to measure the victimization of the same types of violence, in conjunction with the fear survey, the same battery of questions was applied, but with the question being introduced with the phrase "In the last month, you...", which could be answered only "Yes or No".

For comparison purposes, it is important to note that the questions that served as an instrument for measuring the current fear index, as well as victimization, are different from the 16 questions that made up the 2017 index; in addition to some having been adapted to the reality of expanding the use of digital tools for financial transactions. There was also the addition of two questions regarding partisan-political violence, a topic that has been the protagonist of the political debate and the 2022 elections. The percentages per item are shown in Table 2.

TABLE 2

FEAR, BY STATEMENT (IN %)

| | 2022 | | | | 2017 | | | |
|--|---------------|-------------|--|------------|---------------|-------------|------------|--|
| "WOULD YOU SAY YOU ARE AFRAID OF" IF SO, GREAT FEAR OR LOW FEAR?" | Great fear | Low fear | Projection of population that is afraid (high or low) - in millions ⁽¹⁾ | No fear | Great fear | Low fear | No fear | |
| Engaging in fights or physical assaults with other people | 61.6 | 23.9 | 143.5 | 14.5 | 50.4 | 14.4 | 35.2 | |
| Dying by homicide | 70.0 | 12.5 | 138.5 | 17.5 | 65.3 | 9.6 | 25.1 | |
| Being kidnapped | 60.7 | 11.4 | 120.9 | 27.9 | 52.0 | 10.6 | 37.4 | |
| Of being the victim of rape $^{\scriptscriptstyle (2)}$ | 68,4 | 6,2 | 125,1 | 25,5 | 58,9 | 8,7 | 32,3 | |
| Being a victim of a scam and losing money through your cell phone | 73,1 | 15,2 | 148,2 | 11,7 | | | | |
| Having your cell phone robbed or stolen | 70,0 | 17,3 | 146,6 | 12,7 | 60,6 | 14,7 | 24,7 | |
| Being a victim of violence by the Militarized Police Force, the one that carries out uniformed and ostensible policing on the streets | 47,5 | 16,3 | 107,2 | 36,1 | 46,1 | 13,4 | 40,4 | |
| Being a victim of violence by the Civil Police, the one that investigates crimes and registers occurrences in the police stations | 37,9 | 15,3 | 89,3 | 46,8 | 41,8 | 14,2 | 43,9 | |
| Being a victim of violence by Militarized or Civililian Police Forces ⁽³⁾ | 65,7 | | 110,3 | 34,3 | 64,4 | | 35,6 | |
| Being a victim of armed groups (traffickers, militias and gun slingers) | 73,9 | 10,0 | 140,9 | 16,1 | | | | |
| Having personal data leaked online (4) | 75,2 | 13,9 | 149,5 | 10,9 | 58,5 | 12,2 | 29,2 | |
| Being physically attacked for political or partisan choice | 49,9 | 17,6 | 113,4 | 32,5 | | | | |
| Being threatened due to political or party choice | 45,2 | 17,4 | 105,2 | 37,3 | | | | |

SOURCE: Poll "Violence and Democracy" (2022); Brazilian Public Safety Forum; RAPS;Datafolha Institute. (...) Data not collected. (1) The numbers were projected based on the percentage of respondents who declared having been victims in the last month, considering the estimate of the total Brazilians aged 16 years or more in 2021, according to PNAD 2019 data.

 (2) In 2017, the exact question was "Would you say you are afraid of being a victim of sexual assault?"
(3) Considering as "Having fear" cases where the respondent answered affirmatively to at least one of two of the previous questions. Since it was not possible to divide among those who have great or low fear, the rate represents all of those who said they were afraid (great or low) of at least one of the police forces.

(4) In 2017, the exact question was "Would you say you are afraid of having your personal data leaked online?"

| BOX 7 | YEAR | FIRST Quartile | SECOND Quartile | THIRD Quartile | FOURTH Quartile | |
|---|------|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--|
| MEAN INDICES | 2017 | 0,5 | 0, | ,75 | 0,93 | |
| OF FEAR BY QUARTILE (2017 AND 2022) | 2022 | 0,5 | 0, | ,92 | 1 | |

The fear of violence index in 2022 increased compared to 2017, which was 0.68. It is possible to compare in more detail the variation of the questions that were asked in the two years. The fear of dving by homicide grew considerably: 82.5% have this fear in 2022; in 2017 those were 74.9%. Although a drop in intentional violent deaths was observed (2017 was the year in which the record of this violence reached its peak in the last, at least, ten years), it was not perceived by the respondents. On the contrary, the fear grew. And when the relationship between fear and authoritarianism is observed, the propensity to support authoritarian positions is higher among those who are very afraid, an index of 7.48, while among those with less fear, this propensity is 7.16. In a context of concern with the growth of authoritarianism, the emptying of the public safety agenda, through speeches of radicalization and encouragement of violent measures as a solution, seems to replace the fundamental role of the theme in the democratic scenario.

The increase in the bearing and carry of firearms by citizens and the recent events involving lethal violence among civilians for political reasons are some of the reasons that show the relevance of the problem of political-partisan violence. People who are afraid of being physically attacked for their political or partisan choices are 67.5% of respondents in 2022, while

THE INDEX OF FEAR **OF VIOLENCE IN 2022 PRESENTED AN INCREASE RELATIVE** TO 2017. ALTHOUGH HAVING OBSERVED A DROP IN THE NUMBER **OF INTENTIONAL VIOLENT DEATHS. IT** WAS NOT PERCEIVED BY RESPONDENTS. AND WHEN OBSERVED THE RELATIONSHIP **BETWEEN FEAR AND** AUTHORITARIANISM. THE PROPENSITY TO SUPPORT AIITHORITARIAN POSITIONS IS HIGHER **AMONG THOSE WHO ARE VERY AFRAID.**

4. The numbers were projected based on the percentage of respondents who declared having been victims in the last month, considering the estimate of the total Brazilians aged 16 years or more in 2021, according to PNAD 2019 data. Considered period: July 3 to August 3, 2022.

3.2% said they have been victims of threats for the same reason in the last month alone. If we extrapolate this percentage to the Brazilian population aged 16 and over, this is equivalent to around 5.3 million Brazilians threatened by their political or party choices in the last month alone.

Concerns about digital security grew considerably between 2017 and 2022: in 2022, 89.1% are afraid of having their personal data released on the Internet, while in 2017, 70.7% were afraid of having their personal content released. 5.5% said they were victims of a scam or lost money through their cell phone in the last month. Moreover, 5.4% of respondents reported having had their cell phone stolen or stolen in the same period. This means that approximately 9.2 million Brazilians suffered scams or lost money through their cell phones and 9.1 million had their cell phones stolen and robbed in the last month.

There was also an increase in the fear of being a victim of violence by the Militarized Police, which was 59.5% in 2017 and reached 63.8% in 2022. With regard to the State Civil Police, fear rose from 56% in 2017 to 53.2% in 2022. Also in 2022, consider-ing the two police forces, 65.7% of respondents said they were afraid of suffering violence and 1.9% said they had been victims of at least one of the police forces in the 30 days prior to the poll.



LEVEL OF PROPENSITY FOR SUPPORTING AUTHORITARIAN POSITIONS BY FEAR OF VIOLENCE



Fear and victimization also seem to be related to the extent that respondents who suffered violence had higher rates of fear compared to those who did not. While the average fear index for the total sample was 0.76, among those who had not suffered any type of violence, it was 0.75, rising to 0.78 among those who had suffered violence in the last month. The results of the victimization poll are detailed in Table 3.




TABLE 3

VICTIMIZATION, BY STATEMENT (IN %)

| | 2022 | | 2017 | | |
|---|------|---|-------|-----|------|
| IN THE LAST MONTH, YOU | | Projection of the population that suffered violence in the last month - in millions ⁽¹⁾ | No | Yes | No |
| Engaging in fights or physical assaults with other people | 2,6 | 4,3 | 97,4 | 2,6 | 97,4 |
| Was kidnapped | 0,0 | 0,0 | 100,0 | 0,2 | 99,8 |
| Was the victim of rape (2) | 0,3 | 0,5 | 99,7 | 0,5 | 99,5 |
| Was the victim of a scam and lost through the cell phone | 5,5 | 9,2 | 94,5 | | |
| Have the cell phone stolen or robbed | 5,4 | 9,1 | 94,6 | 6,7 | 93,3 |
| Being a victim of violence by the Militarized Police Force, the one that carries out uniformed and ostensible policing on the streets | 1,6 | 2,6 | 98,4 | 1,6 | 98,4 |
| Being a victim of violence by the Civil Police, the one that investigates crimes and records crime reports in the police stations | 0,6 | 1,0 | 99,4 | 0,9 | 99,1 |
| Was the victim of violence by Militarized or Civilian Police Forces ⁽³⁾ | 1,9 | 3,2 | 98,1 | 2,0 | 98,8 |
| Was the victim of armed groups (drug dealers, militia and gun slingers) | 1,1 | 1,9 | 98,9 | | |
| Had personal data leaked online (4) | 2,2 | 3,7 | 97,8 | 0,7 | 99,3 |
| Was physically assaulted due to political or partisal choices | 0,8 | 1,4 | 99,2 | | |
| Was threatened due to political or partisan choices | 3,2 | 5,3 | 96,8 | | |

SOURCE: Source: Poll "Violence and Democracy" (2022); Brazilian Public Safety Forum; RAPS; Datafolha Institute. (...) Data not collected.

(1) The numbers were projected based on the percentage of respondents who declared having been victims in the last month,

(2) In 2017, the exact question was "Last month, have you been the victim of sexual assault?"

(3) Considered "Yes" when respondents answered affirmatively to at least one of the previous questions.

(4) In 2017, the exact question was "In the last month, have you had personal content leaked online?"

In the relationship between fear of crime and violence and the propensity to support civil, human and social rights, an interesting result appears: those who are more afraid tend to support the rights agenda more, with a support index of 7.7, than those who are less afraid, whose index was 7.2. In 2017, the same ratio was also observed, but with a smaller difference: at the time, those who were less afraid had an index of 7.6, against 7.9 among those who were more afraid.

While it is possible to observe an increase in the propensity to support authoritarian positions by those who are more afraid of violence, it is understood that the intersection between fear and support for rights allows us to assume that there is a space of dispute for public policies that respect institutionality and the rights of everyone.

The constant incitements to violence, such as support for arming the population for individual defense and the police force as the main way to mitigate insecurity, promoted by the current government, only seem to gain space in arguments that appeal to a moral agenda, and not as a concrete safety policy project. That means the leading role of public safety policy remains fundamental for containing the advance of persuasive speech on authoritarian positions, and that reveals to be an important mechanism for reestablishing the democratic covenant and citizenship and, as we can see, data show there is room for alternative ways out of the perceived fear.

CHART 26 INDEX OF 2017 AVERAGE PROPENSITY TO 7,6 Less fear SUPPORTING 7,9 More fear THE AGENDA OF RIGHTS DUE TO FEAR OF 2022 AVERAGE VIOLENCE Less fear 7,2 More fear 7,7

0 1 2 3 4 5


7 8

6

9 10



INDEX OF PROPENSITY FOR SUPPORTING THE CIVIL, HUMAN **AND SOCIAL RIGHTS** AGENDA



The Democratic Rule of Law and the Welfare State are two civilizing institutions that came to be consolidated throughout the 20th century, mutually reinforcing each other in the historical experience of nations, especially European ones. How much more progress has been made in de facto universal suffrage, the more democratic the mechanisms of popular representation have become, the more transparent and institutionalized the exercise of political power has become, the more public policies have advanced in meeting collective demands for education, health and social protection in today's developed world. And the more compassionate and comprehensive the Welfare State became, the greater the need for republican institutionalization of public organizations. The conquering of civil, political and social rights was a historical process of struggles, advances and setbacks in all societies, faster in some contexts, slower in others, such as in Brazil (Jannuzzi, 2021).



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THE RESULTS OF THE 2017 POLL REVEALED A FAVORABLE AND PROGRESSIVE **POSITION OF** THE BRAZILIAN **POPULATION TO** THIS AGENDA OF **RIGHTS. POSITIVELY CONFRONTING. TO** SOME EXTENT. THE **SCENARIO THEN IDENTIFIED OF STRONG ADHERENCE TO** AUTHORITARIANISM. **ALSO EVALUATED IN** THIS SAME POLL.

Latin American countries, including Brazil, were marked by long periods of militarization, institutional disruption and various attacks on human, social, civil and political rights. In Brazil, the social pact that marked the construction and resumption of these rights was, among others, the end of the military regime in 1985 and the enactment of the 1988 Constitution, which had wide popular engagement and was, due to its rights-guaranteeing nature, referred to as the "Citizen Constitution". During the little more than three decades since its entry into force, progress, setbacks and many challenges have been noticed. In turn, the term of the latest President of the Republic, Jair Bolsonaro, was marked by episodes and a management with elements that challenged, in many moments, the security and integrity of democratic institutions. The discrediting campaign questioning the security of electronic voting machines and the validity of the results of the elections, the disrespect for the decisions of the Federal Supreme Court and the Ministers themselves, and the constant attack on the press are some of these elements.

These considerations are important in justifying the need to regularly probing the public's feeling on civil, human and social rights agenda in our or any society. In 2017, the FBSP conducted its first poll on adherence to the civil, human and social rights agenda among the Brazilian population, investigating agreement/disagreement with statements related to Gender, Race, Poverty, Inequality, State Secularism and Corrections System Conditions. The results of that poll revealed a favorable and progressive position by the Brazilian population to this agenda of rights, positively confronting, to some extent, the scenario thus identified of strong adhesion to Authoritarianism, also assessed in that same poll. The purpose was to measure the support of Brazilian society to an important set of legislative initiatives in the field of civil and political rights and public policies that had been structured since the 1988 Constitution.

In 2022, the FBSP is once again investigating, this time in partnership with the RAPS, adherence to this agenda, concomitantly with other sociocultural dimensions investigated in the research, to analyze whether Brazilian society would be more cohesive, compassionate or empathetic to the agenda of rights of the citizenry, after realizing the effects of consecutive years of fiscal austerity and the dismantling of social policies, as well as the consequences of two years of pandemic, with an impact on children's school life, employment and the material subsistence of households.

In this sense, the dimensions of the rights of interest were reviewed, reformulating and creating new statements to capture the population's perceptions of Civil, Human and Social Rights, presented in Box 8. There are 12 statements for individual agreement/disagreement positioning.

Even though it is not an exhaustive investigation on the subject, as there is certainly much to improve in this proposal, and using other research and questions, including those raised in this same poll, this effort must therefore be understood as a second attempt to advance the proposition of a scale of adherence to Rights, as necessary as the others presented in this report.

IN 2022. WE ARE BACK TO INVESTIGATING **ADHERENCE TO** THE CITIZENSHIP **RIGHTS AGENDA TO** ANALY7F WHFTHFR BRAZILIAN SOCIETY WOULD BE **MORE COHESIVE.** COMPASSIONATE **OR EMPATHETIC** TO THIS AGENDA. AFTER REALIZING THE EFFECTS OF CONSECUTIVE YEARS OF FISCAL AUSTFRITY AND **DISMANTLING OF** SOCIAL POLICIES. **AS WELL AS THE CONSEQUENCES OF TWO YEARS OF THE** PANDEMIC.



STATEMENTS USED FOR DIMENSIONING THE LEVEL OF PROPENSITY FOR SUPPORTING THE CIVIL, HUMAN AND SOCIAL RIGHTS AGENDA IN THE BRAZILIAN POPULATION (16 YEARS OF AGE OR MORE)

- Congress should have the same number of men and women.
- Abortion should be banned any situation in Brazil.
- There is no racism in Brazil.
- A same-sex couple (two men or two women) can raise children just as well as a couple consisting of one man and one woman.
- The adoption of racial quotas in Universities and Public Services is important for reducing inequality between whites and blacks in Brazil.
- If a person is very poor, it is fair that they receive "Auxílio Brasil" or "Bolsa Família".
- If a person is starving, it is essential that they receive public assistance (City Halls, State Government, Federal Government).
- Changes in labor laws have brought more jobs.
- Improving conditions in Brazilian prisons is fundamental to reducing the power of crime syndicates and organized crime.
- Indigenous peoples must have the right to have their land demarcated.
- Freedom of the press contributes to a democratic, fair and transparent society.
- Brazilian society would be safer if people carried guns to protect themselves from violence.

The Index of Propensity to Support the Agenda of Civil, Human and Social Rights is 7.6 in 2022, lower than as recorded in 2017, which was 7.8. However, the comparison must conducted in a cautious fashion: the statements applied in the interviews to measure the indices were different in the two years and, of the 12 questions used in 2022, only 5 are safely comparable to those from 2017. Moreover, as the response levels were different, the agreement criterion also changed.

In the 2017 poll, agreement added "strongly agree" and "partially agree", while disagreement was the sum of "strongly disagree" and "partially disagree". The ones that remained practically identical are those regarding the existence of racism (and in 2017, the statement was complemented by the recognition only of class differences), on the adoption of racial quotas, on the ability of homosexual couples to raise children so well and heterosexuals, support for aid to the poorest (with the difference that, in 2022, Auxílio Brasil was included in the question, which did not exist in 2017) and, finally, regarding the relationship between prison conditions and organized crime. Overall, higher levels of agreement with the statements indicate greater support for the rights, with the exception of some inverse statements, i.e., when the disagreement evidences support for rights. They are: "Abortion should be banned in any situation in Brazil", "There is no racism in Brazil", "Changes in labor laws have brought more jobs", and "Brazilian society would be safer if people carried guns to protect themselves from violence".

The distribution of agreement and disagreement by statement is described in Chart 27. THE INDEX OF PROPENSITY TO SUPPORT THE AGENDA OF CIVIL, HUMAN AND SOCIAL RIGHTS IS 7.6 IN 2022, LOWER THAN AS RECORDED IN 2017, WHICH WAS 7.8.




The highest percentages of agreement are found in the support of in- come transfer programs or State assistance to people who are experiencing hunger, measured by the statements "If a person is hungry, it is essential that they receive public assistance (City halls, State Government, Federal Government)", in which 92.1% of respondents agree, and "If a person is very poor, it is fair that they receive 'Auxílio Brasil' or 'Bolsa Família'" with which 87.7% agree.

Recognition of racism and support for gender equality among political representatives in the National Congress are, respectively, between 83.4% and 82.2% of respondents. 82% believe that indigenous peoples have the right to demarcation of their lands. It is worth noting that, when compared to the previous items, the lowest support for rights is found in the position on racial quotas (Affirmative Action): 67.6% think that affirmative action has an impact on reducing inequality between black and white people. The position is the same, 67.6%, on the statement "Improving the conditions of Brazilian prisons is essential to reduce the power of crime syndicates and organized crime".

Despite recording the greatest disagreement, it is not to be overlooked the fact that 67.6% recognize a relationship between the precarious con- dition of prisons and the strengthening of crime syndicates and organized crime. Regarding firearms, 66.4% disagreed with the supposed security brought by the arms of the civilian population. In this sense, once again, there is a window of opportunity to strengthen the public security agenda in line with the guarantees of rights, supported by a significant portion of respondents.

Although they appear to support the rights of women and the LGB- TQIA+ population, respondents still feel divided on the issue of abortion rights. The statement tries to measure support for the ban in all types of cases, and 36.2% consider that there are some cases in which the right to abortion should

66.4% DISAGREE WITH THE ALLEGED SAFETY BROUGHT **BY ARMING** THE CIVILIAN **POPULATION.** IN THIS SENSE. **ONCE AGAIN. THERE** IS A WINDOW OF **OPPORTUNITY** TO STRENGTHEN THE PUBLIC SECURITY AGENDA IN LINE WITH THE **GUARANTEES OF RIGHTS. SUPPORTED BY A SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF RESPONDENTS**




be guaranteed. However, 41.8% agree with the statement that the procedure should be prohibited in all cases, a significant number of respondents who veto the right to abortion, even in cases in which Brazilian law already guarantees it.

Some sociodemographic variables significantly impact support of rights. Women score 7.71, while men score an average 7.46. The youngest, aged 16 to 24, score 7.81, the age group most likely to support rights, compared to 7.35 for people aged 60 and over. Blacks also show higher support for the agenda of rights, scoring an average 7.78, than other groups according to race/ color, where whites score an average 7.56. Other variables, such as socioeconomic class and geographic regions did not present such relevant differences.




CHART 28





| PROPENSITY FOR SUPPORTING THE AGENDA OF CIVIL, HUMAN AND SOCIAL RIGHTS, BY AGE GROUP - BRAZIL, 2022 | 16 to 24 years of age 25 to 34 years of age 35 to 44 years of age 45 to 59 years of age | | | | | | | ; 7 7 | 7,8 7,61 ,59 ,56 | | | | |
|---|--|---|---|---|---|---|---|-------------|---------------------------|---|---|----|--|
| | 60 years or more | | | | | | | 7,3 | 35 | | | | |
| 2022 AVERAGE | | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | |

CHART 30



THE ISSUES THAT PEOPLE TEND TO SUPPORT MOST STRONGLY ARE PUBLIC ASSISTANCE **TO PEOPLE WHO ARE GOING HUNGRY. INCOME TRANSFER PROGRAMS FOR** THE POOREST. THE DEMARCATION OF INDIGENOUS LANDS. **GENDER PARITY IN** THE LEGISLATURE AND THE ABILITY TO **RAISING CHILDREN BY HOMOSEXUAL COUPLES. THERE** IS ALSO A STRONG **RECOGNITION OF RACISM IN BRAZIL.**

The issues that people tend to support most strongly (i.e., the highest percentages of "strongly agree") are public assistance to people who are starving (35.1% strongly agree); income transfer programs for the poorest (31.3%); the demarcation of indigenous lands (26.8%), gender parity in the Legislative Branch (25%) and the ability to raise children by homosexual couples (24.4%). This strong support can also be observed in those who said they totally disagreed with "There is no racism in Brazil", which is 35.8%.

To enable a comparison with the 2017 survey, of the questions that were relevant, the sum of "completely agree", "agree" and "partially agree" was considered for agreement, since the agreement scale in 2017 only considered "completely agree" and "partially agree". The inclusion of the "partly agree" position demonstrates the growth of support for all 5 questions that were repeated in the current poll.

In 2017, 61% agreed at least in part with the statement "Improving conditions in Brazilian prisons is essential for reducing the power of crime syndicates and organized crime"; by 2022, 77% agree at least partially. Support for income transfer programs was 84% in 2017, reaching 95.7% in 2022 among those who support at least in part, taking into account that in 2022 "Auxílio Brasil" was included in the statement, which can generate some bias. 86.2% agree, at least in part, that racism exists in Brazil, while, in 2017, 70% agreed that, in addition to class issues, there is racism in Brazil. Support for affirmative action, at least partially, went from 69% to 75.9% in 2022, while belief in the ability of homosexual families to raise children went from 61% to 73.1% (considering at least partial support).

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS



In Brazil, a set of variables combine and contribute to the worsening of the social and institutional crisis. Polarization and conflicts of interest have transformed violence into a non-isolated phenomenon and a factor that permeates Brazilian politics and puts democracy itself at risk.

In this context, it is necessary to identify elements that threaten the democratic regime, measure their impacts on public opinion, and point out trends in Brazilian society in relation to authoritarianism, its satisfaction with the democratic regime, its degree of agreement with the typical rights agenda of democracies, and even their willingness to comply with electo- ral results. This was the main contribution of the national public opinion survey carried out, revealing a drop in support for authoritarian positions, the massive support of the Brazilian population for the democratic regime, the perception that the "secret budget" harms democracy and, still, the significant demonstration support - from almost 90% of respondents - for the winner of the polls to be sworn in on January 1, 2023.

The research shows that the public security agenda assumes a strategic character in the formation of social representation regarding the way in which the State and society should deal with contemporary social conflicts, it also prioritizes the political-institutional sphere through actions to preserve civic space and protect freedom and democracy.

Contrary to what the most pessimists might suppose, the research reveals that the civil, social, political and human rights agenda has gained supporters and has been seen as a protective factor against the current threats. Respondents recognize the racism that exists in Brazilian society and, similarly, are mostly against the armament of the civilian population; are in favor of the demarcation of Indigenous Lands, among other rights set forth in the Federal Constitution. There is great agreement that those who go hungry should be supported by the State, the level of support for homosexual families has risen and also the perception that the conditions of the prison system must be improved.

THE RESEARCH SHOWS THAT THE PUBLIC **SECURITY AGENDA ASSUMES A STRATEGIC CHARACTER IN THE** FORMATION OF SOCIAL REPRESENTATION **REGARDING THE** WAY IN WHICH THE STATE AND SOCIETY SHOULD DEAL WITH **CONTEMPORARY** SOCIAL CONFLICTS. IT ALSO PRIORITIZES **THE POLITICAL-**INSTITUTIONAL SPHERE THROUGH ACTIONS **TO PRESERVE CIVIC** SPACE AND PROTECT FREEDOM AND **DEMOCRACY.**

The challenges are the fear of being a victim of violence grows, the concern about digital violence, which is growing, and those who are most afraid are more likely to defend authoritarian measures, demonstrating that the exploitation of the rhetoric of fear can, dangerously, be manipulated to justify measures and actions beyond the scope of institutions.


The data comes in conjunction with other information indicating that it is necessary to recognize dissonances in the model of federative and republican organization of the State, with data that show that the adult population of the country believes in the Judiciary, for example, but that they do not necessarily agree with the form of how justice is administered. Consequently, what is necessary is having better communication the results of laws and of the Brazilian legal system and what is the result of organi – zational culture and institutional mentality, which are subject to the same social and political conditions that circulate in society. Another conclusion derives from the poll, about the meaning of democracy and the importance of investing in the debate on its meanings and significances. **IT IS NECESSARY** COMMUNICATE RFTTFR COMMUNICATE WHAT IS THE RESULT **OF LAWS AND THE BRAZILIAN LEGAL** SYSTEM AND WHAT IS THE RESULT OF ORGANIZATIONAL **CIII TURES AND** INSTITUTIONAL MENTALITIES THAT **ARE SUBJECT TO** THE SAME SOCIAL AND POLITICAL **CONDITIONS THAT CIRCULATE IN** SOCIETY.



This poll, conducted in a partnership between Political Action Network for Sustainability (RAPS) and the Brazilian Public Safety Forum (FBSP), with the support of the Canada Fund for Local Initiatives (FCIL), sought to strengthen the understanding and providing researchers, political agents, political parties, candidates, society and organizations in civil society, involved in defending democracy, with data and analysis that reflect on the democratic situation prior to the 2022 elections. Armed with these understandings, we seek to contribute to the strengthening of democratic institutions and the construction of a safer and more egalitarian country for everyone.



APPENDICES



SAMPLE CHARACTERIZATION

Total Sample N= 2.100

| Sex | Absolute numbers | % |
|---------|---------------------|------|
| Men's | 990 | 47,1 |
| Women's | 1.110 | 52,9 |

| Age | Absolute numbers | % |
|-------------------------|---------------------|------|
| 16 to 24 years of age | 355 | 16,9 |
| 25 to 34 years of age | 394 | 18,8 |
| 35 to 44 years of age | 410 | 19,5 |
| 45 to 59 years of age | 509 | 24,2 |
| 60 years of age or more | 432 | 20,6 |

| Region | Absolute numbers | % |
|-----------|---------------------|------|
| Southeast | 915 | 43,7 |
| Northeast | 548 | 26,1 |
| South | 311 | 14,8 |
| North | 163 | 7,7 |
| Midwest | 163 | 7,7 |

| Nature of the Municipality | Absolute numbers | % |
|--|---------------------|------|
| Capital | 506 | 24,1 |
| Other municipalities in the Metropolitan Region | 367 | 17,5 |
| Countryside | 1.227 | 58,4 |

| Municipality Size | Absolute numbers | % |
|---|---------------------|------|
| Population up to 50 thousand | 606 | 28,8 |
| Population between 50 and 200 thousand | 478 | 22,8 |
| Population between 200 and 500 thousand | 338 | 16,1 |
| Population above 500 thousand | 678 | 32,3 |

| Socioeconomic Class | Absolute numbers | % |
|---------------------|---------------------|------|
| A | 55 | 2,6 |
| B1 | 109 | 5,2 |
| B2 | 324 | 15,4 |
| C1 | 451 | 21,5 |
| C2 | 554 | 26,4 |
| D/E | 607 | 28,9 |

| Level of education | Absolute numbers | % | |
|--|---------------------|------|--|
| Illiterate/ Middle School/ Elementary School I incomplete | 188 | 8,9 | |
| Middle or Elementary School Complete / Incomplete Middle or Elementary School | 350 | 16,6 | |
| Middle or Elementary School II complete | 153 | 7,3 | |
| Incomplete High School or Elementary School Education | 265 | 12,6 | |
| High School or Elementary School Diploma | 701 | 33,4 | |
| Incomplete college education | 153 | 7,3 | |
| College Degree | 211 | 10,0 | |
| Graduate Degree | 81 | 3,9 | |

| Race/color | Absolute numbers | % |
|------------|---------------------|------|
| White | 735 | 35,0 |
| Black | 348 | 16,6 |
| Brown | 816 | 38,9 |
| Yellow | 56 | 2,7 |
| Indigenous | 28 | 1,3 |
| Others | 117 | 5,6 |
| | | |

| Religion or belief system | Absolute numbers | % |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------|------|
| Catholic | 1.014 | 48,3 |
| Evangelic and Neo- Pentecostal | 190 | 9,0 |
| Of African Origin | 54 | 2,6 |
| Others | 441 | 21,0 |
| Pentecostal and Protestant | 402 | 19,1 |

| Sexual orientation | Absolute numbers | % |
|---------------------------------------|---------------------|------|
| Heterosexual | 1.778 | 84,6 |
| Homosexual | 86 | 4,1 |
| Bisexual | 72 | 3,4 |
| Refuses to Answer / Did not answer | 119 | 5,7 |
| Other | 45 | 2,1 |

AUTHORITARIANISM

| Strongly agree | | Agree | | Partially agree | | Discorda em parte | | | |
|--|--|---------------------|-------------------|---------------------|------------------|----------------------|------|--|--|
| Absolute numbers | % | Absolute numbers | % | Absolute numbers | % | Absolute numbers | % | | |
| | What this country needs, above all, before laws or political plans, is some brave, tireless and dedicated leaders in whom the people can put their faith. (n = 2074) | | | | | | | | |
| 555 | 26,4 | 925 | 44,0 | 243 | 11,6 | 70 | 3,3 | | |
| AMost of our perverts. (n = | | s would be solv | ed if we could g | get rid of immor | al people, outca | asts and | | | |
| 456 | 27,1 | 861 | 41,0 | 279 | 13,3 | 126 | 6,0 | | |
| Obedience ar | Obedience and respect for authority are the main virtues we must teach our children. (n = 2100) | | | | | | | | |
| 699 | 33,3 | 1.096 | 52,2 | 193 | 9,2 | 33 | 1,6 | | |
| Men can be d | ivided into two | well-defined cla | asses: the weak | and the strong | g. (n = 2077) | | | | |
| 209 | 9,9 | 645 | 30,7 | 240 | 11,4 | 117 | 5,6 | | |
| Every insult t | o our honor mu | st always be pu | inished. (n = 208 | 81) | | | | | |
| 303 | 14,4 | 852 | 40,6 | 269 | 12,8 | 154 | 7,3 | | |
| Science has i (n = 2076) | ts place, but th | ere are many im | portant things | that the human | mind can never | understand. | | | |
| 512 | 24,4 | 1.119 | 53,3 | 216 | 10,3 | 47 | 2,2 | | |
| Sexual crimes such as rape or attacks on children deserve more than imprisonment; whoever commits these crimes should receive public physical punishment or receive a worse punishment. (n = 2090) | | | | | | | | | |
| 753 | 35,9 | 750 | 35,7 | 235 | 11,2 | 78 | 11,2 | | |
| Nowadays, people increasingly meddle in matters that should only be personal and private. (n = 2085) | | | | | | | | | |
| 611 | 29,1 | 1.032 | 49,1 | 158 | 7,5 | 52 | 2,5 | | |

| Disagree | | Strongly disagree | | Does not know | | Grade | |
|---------------------|---|--|---|--|--|--|--|
| Absolute numbers | % | Absolute numbers | % | Absolute numbers | % | Mean | Standard deviation |
| | | | | | | | |
| 202 | 9,6 | 79 | 3,8 | 26 | 1,2 | 7,73 | 2,28 |
| | | | | | | | |
| 256 | 12,2 | 103 | 4,9 | 18 | 0,9 | 7,33 | 2,43 |
| | | | | | | | |
| 58 | 2,8 | 21 | 1,0 | - | - | 8,47 | 1,57 |
| | | | | | | | |
| 637 | 30,3 | 230 | 10,9 | 23 | 1,1 | 5,85 | 2,76 |
| | | | | | | | |
| 393 | 18,7 | 109 | 5,2 | 19 | 0,9 | 6,81 | 2,52 |
| | | | | | | | |
| 140 | 6,7 | 42 | 2,0 | 24 | 1,2 | 8,02 | 1,92 |
| | | | | | | | |
| 184 | 8,8 | 89 | 4,2 | 10 | 0,5 | 7,9 | 2,37 |
| | | | | | | | |
| 168 | 8,0 | 65 | 3,1 | 15 | 0,7 | 8 | 2,14 |
| | Absolute 202 256 58 637 393 140 184 | Absolute % 202 9,6 256 12,2 58 2,8 637 30,3 393 18,7 140 6,7 184 8,8 | Absolute Absolute 202 9,6 79 256 12,2 103 58 2,8 21 637 30,3 230 393 18,7 109 140 6,7 42 184 8,8 89 | Absolute % Absolute % 202 9,6 79 3,8 256 12,2 103 4,9 58 2,8 21 1,0 637 30,3 230 10,9 393 18,7 109 5,2 140 6,7 42 2,0 184 8,8 89 4,2 | Absolute numbers % Absolute numbers % Absolute numbers 202 9,6 79 3,8 26 256 12,2 103 4,9 18 58 2,8 21 1,0 - 637 30,3 230 10,9 23 933 18,7 109 5,2 19 140 6,7 42 2,0 24 184 8,8 89 4,2 10 | Absolutes % Absolutes % 202 9,6 79 3,8 26 1,2 256 12,2 103 4,9 18 0,9 58 2,8 21 1,0 - - 637 30,3 230 10,9 23 1,1 933 18,7 109 5,2 19 0,9 140 6,7 42 2,0 24 1,2 184 8,8 89 4,2 10 0,5 | Absolutes % Absolutes % Mean 202 9.6 79 3.8 26 1.2 7.3 256 12.2 103 4.9 18 0.9 7.33 58 2.8 21 1.0 - - 8.47 637 30.3 230 10.9 23 1.1 5.85 393 18.7 109 5.2 19 0.9 6.31 140 6.7 42 2.0 24 1.2 8.02 184 8.8 89 4.2 10 0.5 7.9 |

| Strongly agree | | Agree | | Partially agree | | Discorda em parte | |
|---------------------|--------------------------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------|---------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-----|
| Absolute numbers | % | Absolute numbers | % | Absolute numbers | % | Absolute numbers | % |
| | ered, impolite in eople. (n = 209 | ndividual with ba 2) | ad customs can | ı hardly make fr | iends | | |
| 321 | 15,3 | 766 | 36,5 | 271 | 12,9 | 168 | 8,0 |
| If we talked le | ess and worked | more, we woul | d all be better o | off. (n = 2097) | | | |
| 688 | 32,8 | 1.021 | 48,6 | 177 | 8,4 | 68 | 3,2 |
| We must all h | ave absolute fa | ith in a superna | tural power wh | ose decisions w | ve must abide b | y. (n = 2069) | |
| 385 | 18,4 | 880 | 41,9 | 307 | 14,6 | 82 | 3,9 |
| | ng worse than a or their parents | a person who do s. (n = 2094) | oesn't feel deep | love, gratitude, | | | |
| 731 | 34,8 | 967 | 46,0 | 115 | 5,5 | 55 | 2,6 |
| Homosexuals | are almost crir | ninals and shou | ld receive sevei | re punishment. | (n = 2078) | | |
| 123 | 5,9 | 211 | 10,1 | 78 | 3,7 | 86 | 4,1 |
| No decent, no | ormal person in | their right mind | would think of | offending a frie | nd or close rela | tive (n = 2088) | |
| 485 | 23,1 | 999 | 47,6 | 178 | 8,5 | 70 | 3,3 |
| | oung people hav thoughts. (n = 2 | /e rebellious ide 085) | eas that, over th | e years, they w | vill have to over | come in order | |
| 368 | 17,5 | 1.116 | 53,1 | 305 | 14,5 | 74 | 3,5 |

Note: The n after each item indicates the sub-sample used for calculating the item score, not taking into consideration "Doesn't know" answers.

| Disagree | | Strongly disagree | | Does not know | | Grade | |
|---------------------|------|----------------------|------|---------------------|-----|-------|--------------------|
| Absolute numbers | % | Absolute numbers | % | Absolute numbers | % | Mean | Standard deviation |
| | | | | | | | |
| 427 | 20,3 | 139 | 6,6 | 8 | 0,4 | 6,64 | 2,62 |
| | | | | | | | |
| 102 | 4,9 | 41 | 2,0 | 3 | 0,2 | 8,25 | 1,89 |
| | | | | | | | |
| 298 | 14,2 | 117 | 5,5 | 31 | 1,5 | 7,17 | 2,47 |
| | | | | | | | |
| 160 | 7,6 | 65 | 3,1 | 6 | 0,3 | 8,14 | 2,16 |
| | | | | | | | |
| 827 | 39,4 | 752 | 35,8 | 23 | 1,1 | 3,82 | 2,54 |
| | | | | | | | |
| 279 | 13,3 | 78 | 3,7 | 12 | 0,6 | 7,55 | 2,37 |
| | | | | | | | |
| 160 | 7,6 | 62 | 3,0 | 16 | 0,7 | 7,68 | 1,32 |
| | | | | | | | |

RIGHTS

| Strongly agree | | Agree | | Partially agree | | Discorda em parte | |
|---------------------|--|---------------------|-------------------|---------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-----|
| Absolute numbers | % | Absolute numbers | % | Absolute numbers | % | Absolute numbers | % |
| Congress sh | ould have the sa | ame number of i | men and womer | n. (n = 2078) | | | |
| 525 | 25,0 | 1.201 | 57,2 | 153 | 7,3 | 32 | 1,5 |
| Abortion sho | ould be banned i | n any situation i | n Brazil (n = 207 | 78) | | | |
| 292 | 13,9 | 587 | 27,9 | 206 | 9,8 | 192 | 9,2 |
| There is no r | acism in Brazil (| R). (n = 2089) | | | | | |
| 61 | 2,9 | 176 | 8,4 | 41 | 2,0 | 58 | 2,8 |
| | couple (two mer sisting of one m | | | | las | | |
| 512 | 24,4 | 846 | 40,3 | 177 | 8,4 | 68 | 3,3 |
| | n of racial quota ites and blacks i | | | vices is importa | ant for reducing | inequality | |
| 444 | 21,2 | 975 | 46,4 | 174 | 8,3 | 58 | 2,8 |
| lf a person is | s very poor, it is | fair that they re | eceive "Auxílio B | Brasil" or "Bolsa | Família". (n = 20 | 095) | |
| 657 | 31,3 | 1.184 | 56,4 | 168 | 8,0 | 22 | 1,1 |
| | s starving, it is e ernment). (n = 20 | | ey receive publi | c assistance (C | ity Halls, State | Government, | |
| 737 | 35,1 | 1.197 | 57,0 | 116 | 5,5 | 12 | 0,6 |

| Disagree | | Strongly disagree | | Does not know | | Grade | |
|---------------------|------|----------------------|------|---------------------|-----|-------|--------------------|
| Absolute numbers | % | Absolute numbers | % | Absolute numbers | % | Mean | Standard deviation |
| | | | | | | | |
| 121 | 5,8 | 45 | 2,1 | 22 | 1,0 | 8,14 | 1,86 |
| | | | | | | | |
| 535 | 25,5 | 266 | 12,7 | 22 | 1,0 | 5,71 | 2,85 |
| | | | | | | | |
| 1.000 | 47,6 | 752 | 35,8 | 11 | 0,5 | 8,2 | 2,16 |
| | | | | | | | |
| 317 | 15,1 | 159 | 7,6 | 21 | 1,0 | 7,22 | 2,69 |
| | | | | | | | |
| 273 | 13,0 | 127 | 6,1 | 48 | 2,3 | 7,37 | 2,5 |
| | | | | | | | |
| 50 | 2,4 | 14 | 0,7 | 5 | 0,2 | 8,52 | 1,44 |
| | | | | | | | |
| 27 | 1,3 | 8 | 0,4 | 3 | 0,2 | 8,71 | 1,24 |
| | | | | | | | |

| Strongly agree | | Agree | | Partially agree | | Discorda em parte | |
|---------------------|--------------------------------------|--|-------------------|---------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-----|
| Absolute numbers | % | Absolute numbers | % | Absolute numbers | % | Absolute numbers | % |
| Changes in la | abor laws have l | brought more jo | bs. (R). (n = 203 | 38) | | | |
| 152 | 7,3 | 632 | 30,1 | 23 | 13,5 | 138 | 6,6 |
| | nditions in Braz nd organized cr | tilian prisons is t ime. (n = 2068) | fundamental to | reducing the po | wer | | |
| 439 | 20,9 | 980 | 46,7 | 197 | 9,4 | 49 | 2,3 |
| Indigenous p | eoples must hav | ve the right have | e their land dem | arcated. (n = 20 | 069) | | |
| 564 | 26,8 | 1.159 | 55,2 | 155 | 7,4 | 28 | 1,4 |
| Freedom of t | he press contri | butes to a demo | ocratic, fair and | transparent so | ciety. (n = 2059) |) | |
| 477 | 22,7 | 116 | 53,2 | 224 | 10,7 | 50 | 2,4 |
| | iety would be s e (R). (n = 2085) | afer if people ca | arried guns to p | rotect themselv | res | | |
| 105 | 5,0 | 277 | 13,2 | 203 | 9,7 | 103 | 4,9 |

Note: The n after each item indicates the sub-sample used for calculating the item score, not taking into consideration "Doesn't know" answers.

(R) Item with reversed content, opposed to the majority of the items in the Section.

| Disagree | | Strongly disagree | | Does not know | | Grade | |
|---------------------|------|----------------------|------|---------------------|-----|-------|--------------------|
| Absolute numbers | % | Absolute numbers | % | Absolute numbers | % | Mean | Standard deviation |
| | | | | | | | |
| 604 | 28,8 | 228 | 10,9 | 62 | 2,9 | 5,89 | 2,67 |
| | | | | | | | |
| 311 | 14,8 | 92 | 4,4 | 32 | 1,5 | 7,39 | 2,44 |
| | | | | | | | |
| 122 | 5,8 | 41 | 1,9 | 31 | 1,5 | 8,19 | 1,85 |
| | | | | | | | |
| 152 | 7,2 | 40 | 1,9 | 41 | 1,9 | 7,95 | 1,94 |
| | | | | | | | |
| 889 | 42,3 | 507 | 24,1 | 15 | 0,7 | 7,32 | 2,54 |
| | | | | | | | |

DEMOCRACY

| Strongly agree | | Agree | | Partially agree | | Discorda em parte | |
|---------------------------------|--|--|-------------------|---------------------|------------------|----------------------|------|
| Absolute numbers | % | Absolute numbers | % | Absolute numbers | % | Absolute numbers | % |
| In order to su respecting th | | est criminals, the | ere are occasio | ns when the au | thorities may ac | et without | |
| 174 | 8,29 | 532 | 25,33 | 200 | 9,52 | 107 | 5,10 |
| | s a crisis situati 1 order to solve | ion, it doesn't m the problems. | atter if the gove | ernment bypass | es laws, Congr | ess or | |
| 793 | 10,38 | 793 | 37,76 | 231,00 | 11,00 | 129 | 6,14 |
| Despite havir | ng some probler | ms, democracy | is preferable to | any other form | of government | | |
| 409 | 19,48 | 1065 | 50,71 | 194 | 9,24 | 68 | 3,24 |
| People choos | sing their leader | s in free and tra | ansparent electi | ions is essentia | l for democracy | <i>.</i> | |
| 645 | 30,71 | 1231 | 58,62 | 80 | 3,81 | 26 | 1,24 |
| The people had democracy. | aving an active | voice and partic | cipating in key g | overnment dec | isions is essent | ial for | |
| 653 | 31,10 | 1205 | 57,38 | 103 | 4,90 | 23 | 1,10 |
| Human rights | being respecte | ed is essential fo | or democracy. | | | | |
| 627 | 29,86 | 1219,00 | 58,05 | 111,00 | 5,29 | 29 | 1,38 |
| In some case | es it would be ju | stifiable for the | military to supp | oort or seize po | wer through a c | coup d'état. | |
| 109 | 5,19 | 348,00 | 16,57 | 152 | 7,24 | 92 | 4,38 |
| | eclared the win rn in on January | iner of the elect / 1 st . | ions by the Elec | toral Justice | | | |
| 535 | 25,48 | 1315,00 | 62,62 | 99 | 4,71 | 21,00 | 1,00 |

| Disagree | | Strongly disagree | | Does not know | Does not know | | |
|---------------------|-------|----------------------|-------|---------------------|------------------|------|--------------------|
| Absolute numbers | % | Absolute numbers | % | Absolute numbers | % | Mean | Standard deviation |
| | | | | | | | |
| 782 | 37,24 | 273 | 13,00 | 32 | 1,52 | 6,30 | 2,17 |
| | | | | | | | |
| 503,00 | 23,95 | 177 | 8,43 | 49 | 2,33 | 5,82 | 3,50 |
| | | | | | | | |
| 218 | 10,38 | 52 | 2,48 | 94 | 4,48 | 7,68 | 2,16 |
| | | | | | | | |
| 72 | 3,43 | 17 | 0,81 | 29 | 1,38 | 8,52 | 1,52 |
| | | | | | | | |
| 61,00 | 2,90 | 20,00 | 0,95 | 35,00 | 1,67 | 8,53 | 1,51 |
| | | | | | | | |
| 75,00 | 3,57 | 19 | 0,90 | 20 | 0,95 | 8,46 | 1,56 |
| | | | | | | | |
| 852,00 | 40,57 | 469,00 | 22,33 | 78 | 3,71 | 7,17 | 2,64 |
| | | | | | | | |
| 65,00 | 3,10 | 15 | 0,71 | 50 | 8,45 | 8,45 | 1,44 |

| Strongly agree | | Agree | | Partially agree | | Discorda em parte | | | | |
|---------------------|---|----------------------------|------------------|---------------------|-------------------|----------------------|------|--|--|--|
| Absolute numbers | % | Absolute numbers | % | Absolute numbers | % | Absolute numbers | % | | | |
| The electoral | The electoral process for choosing representatives in Brazil is very satisfactory. | | | | | | | | | |
| 221 | 10,52 | 726,00 | 34,57 | 266 | 12,67 | 153 | 7,29 | | | |
| | The separation of the three branches of power (Executive, Legislative and Judicial) in Brazil is very satisfactory. | | | | | | | | | |
| 161 | 7,67 | 602 | 28,67 | 306 | 14,57 | 146,00 | 6,95 | | | |
| | t for democracy eyond its autho | y that the courts rity. | s are able to pr | event the gover | nment | | | | | |
| 336 | 16,00 | 983,00 | 46,81 | 207 | 9,86 | 85 | 4,05 | | | |
| | idget, which is t racy in Brazil. | the non-transpa | arent transfer o | f public funds to | o electoral stror | ngholds, | | | | |
| 429 | 20,43 | 986,00 | 46,95 | 163,00 | 7,76 | 67,00 | 3,19 | | | |

Note: The n after each item indicates the sub-sample used for calculating the item score, not taking into consideration "Doesn't know" answers.

(R) Item with reversed content, opposed to the majority of the items in the Section.

| Disagree | | Strongly disagree | | Does not know | | Grade | |
|---------------------|-------|----------------------|------|---------------------|------|-------|--------------------|
| Absolute numbers | % | Absolute numbers | % | Absolute numbers | % | Mean | Standard deviation |
| | | | | | | | |
| 543 | 25,86 | 143 | 6,81 | 48,00 | 2,29 | 6,26 | 2,63 |
| | | | | | | | |
| 605,00 | 28,81 | 181 | 8,62 | 99 | 4,71 | 5,85 | 2,63 |
| | | | | | | | |
| 331 | 15,76 | 92 | 4,38 | 66 | 3,14 | 7,18 | 2,44 |
| | | | | | | | |
| 265,00 | 12,62 | 109,00 | 5,19 | 81,00 | 3,86 | 7,43 | 2,46 |
| | | | | | | | |

FBSP Institutional sheet

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Institutional Coordination Juliana Martins

Supervision of the Data Center Isabela Sobral

Technical Team

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Administrative and Financial Supervision Débora Lopes Equipe Administrativa Elaine Rosa Sueli Bueno Antônia de Araújo

RAPS Institutional sheet

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